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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
CONTEMPORARY ASPECTS OF DIVIDENDS: BEFORE AND DURING THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
by 
Gizelle Fernandez Perretti 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Ali M. Parhizgari, Major Professor 
The number of dividend paying firms has been on the decline since the popularity 
of stock repurchases in the 1980s, and the recent financial crisis has brought about a wave 
of dividend reductions and omissions. This dissertation examined the U.S. firms and 
American Depository Receipts that are listed on the U.S. equity exchanges according to 
their dividend paying history in the previous twelve quarters.  While accounting for the 
state of the economy, the firm’s size, profitability, earned equity, and growth 
opportunities, it determines whether or not the firm will pay a dividend in the next 
quarter. It also examined the likelihood of a dividend change. Further, returns of firms 
were examined according to their dividend paying history and the state of the economy 
using the Fama-French three-factor model.  
Using forward, backward, and step-wise selection logistic regressions, the results 
show that firms with a history of regular and uninterrupted dividend payments are likely 
to continue to pay dividends, while firms that do not have a history of regular dividend 
payments are not likely to begin to pay dividends or continue to do so. The results of a set 
of generalized polytomous logistic regressions imply that dividend paying firms are more 
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likely to reduce dividend payments during economic expansions, as opposed to 
recessions. Also the analysis of returns using the Fama-French three factor model reveals 
that dividend paying firms are earning significant abnormal positive returns. 
As a special case, a similar analysis of dividend payment and dividend change 
was applied to American Depository Receipts that trade on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and 
AMEX exchanges and are issued by the Bank of New York Mellon. Returns of American 
Depository Receipts were examined using the Fama-French two-factor model for 
international firms. The results of the generalized polytomous logistic regression analyses 
indicate that dividend paying status and economic conditions are also important for 
dividend level change of American Depository Receipts, and Fama-French two-factor 
regressions alone do not adequately explain returns for these securities.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1. General Introduction to Dividends 
Although previous studies have identified a decline in the number of firms that 
distribute dividends, many firms continue to pay them. From 1990 through 2009, 111 
firms paid a regular, quarterly, cash dividend in every quarter. That is a relatively small 
number of firms, yet the consistency exemplifies that regular quarterly dividends are 
important to investors, despite the triviality assigned to dividends by previous literature. 
The large body of literature on dividends also attests to their importance. 
In the past, dividend studies largely concentrated on the dividend-earnings 
relationship. For example, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992) examine the 
relation between earnings and dividends. Among other things, they highlight the great 
reduction in dividends followed by losses in earnings and earnings difficulties. Past 
earnings problems are also related to dividend omissions. Of the firms examined in 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992), 15% of negative earners omitted dividends. 
After the 1990s, dividend related studies began to document declines in dividend 
paying firms. This trend was initially documented by Fama and French (2001). Skinner 
(2008) found that firms who only pay dividends (without making any repurchases) 
declined from 13% in 1980 to 7% in 2005. A decline in earnings, as well as an increase in 
the volatility of earnings has also been documented (Skinner, 2008). DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) point out that only 11.8% of firms reported negative 
earnings in 1978, while 50.2% of firms reported negative earnings in 2002. Despite the 
decline in the number of dividend paying firms, the amount paid in dividends has 
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increased. Firms that do pay dividends have increased the dividend amount over time 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 2004). 
More recent studies have found that the dividend-earnings relationship has 
weakened. Rather than examine the direct relation between dividends and future 
earnings, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) examine the relation between earned 
equity and dividends. They argue that this long term measure of profitability is better 
than a short term measure in determining the propensity to pay dividends. Using this 
measure, their results indicate that dividend payment is more likely following increases in 
earned equity. 
Stock repurchases have become the new dividend. Rather than being committed 
to traditional cash dividends, firms repurchase shares as a way of distributing earnings. 
Although the relation between dividends and earnings has weakened, Skinner (2008) 
points out that a strong relationship between repurchases and earnings now exists. In 
effect, repurchases have replaced dividends. 
1.2. Ex-post Dividend Studies 
Most studies related to dividends are ex-post studies. Ex-post studies examine 
past data and discuss future implications. Examples of these studies include those 
mentioned in the above sub-section. For example DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 
(1992) relate current losses to dividend reductions. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz 
(2006) relate earned equity to the propensity to pay dividends. Skinner (2008) relates past 
earnings to current repurchases and regular dividends. None of these studies use 
dividends as a predictor for future variables. 
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Many dividend paying studies focus on ex-dividend days. The ex-dividend day is 
the day which determines who receives the dividend. The individual who owns or 
purchases the share on the ex-dividend day will be the owner of record on the record 
date. This is the party who receives the dividend, even if the share is sold before the 
dividend payment day. Theory suggests that the price of the share will increase in an 
amount equal to the dividend in the days leading up to the ex-dividend day. After the ex-
dividend day, the price of the share will decrease in an amount equal to the dividend. 
Studies on this topic attempt to measure whether dividends are in fact recaptured. What 
they find, for the most part, is that the change in the price of the stock is less than the 
amount of the dividend. Attempts to link the difference are common in dividend 
literature. Most studies link the difference to transaction costs, taxes, and other market 
frictions (Campbell and Beranek (1995), Boyd and Jagannathan (1994), and Elton, 
Gruber, and Blake (2005)). Ex-dividend day studies have even been extended to 
international firms. Gorman, Mahajan, and Weigand (2004) examine the ex-dividend 
behavior of American Depository Receipts. 
Other dividend studies explore microstructure issues. For example, Graham, 
Koski, and Loewenstein (2006) study information flow and liquidity surrounding 
dividend announcements. They find that anticipated dividend announcements are 
followed by a short term increase in volume and liquidity. Adverse selection and price 
volatility are not affected by anticipated dividend announcements. This is consistent with 
previous microstructure models. However, anticipated announcements of important 
consequence do experience adverse information effects, with spreads remaining wide for 
a significant period of time. Although unanticipated dividend announcements do not 
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exhibit adverse information effects and price volatility long after the announcement, they 
are associated with wide spreads, less depth, and increased volume. This implies that 
dividend changes may signal fundamental firm changes. 
1.3. Ex-ante Dividend Studies 
Ex-ante studies on the topic of dividends are rare. These studies relate dividends 
with variables in the future, unlike the ex-post studies mentioned above. 
Miller and Modigliani have authored a few ex-ante dividend studies. Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) and Modigliani and Miller (1959) relate dividend payment to future 
earnings. They introduce the “information content of dividends” hypothesis and posit that 
firms with temporary earnings losses are less likely to reduce dividends, compared to 
firms with permanent earnings problems.  
Another example of this type of study is Parhizgari’s working paper “Dividends, 
taxes, and global financial meltdown.” This paper considers ex-ante effects by linking 
dividend payments and the effects of variables on payments with potential future 
variables, as opposed to past variables. 
1.4. Dividends and Taxation 
The controversy surrounding dual taxation of dividends has long been part of 
dividend literature. Income is taxed at the corporate level, and dividends to shareholders 
are paid from the firm’s after-tax income. Income taxes are once again applied to the 
dividend cash flows as part of the shareholder’s income. This is known as the dual 
taxation problem. Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 1963) address the dual taxation 
problem in terms of the optimal dividend payment policy and conclude that because 
dividends are taxed twice, financing with debt is optimal and firms should not distribute 
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dividends. They concede, however, that firms should not attempt to finance the maximum 
amount possible with debt because at times the cost of capital is still less expensive when 
dual taxation is considered.  
This issue is also examined by Black (1976). Given Miller and Modigliani’s 
(1961) conclusions that dividend policy is irrelevant, he argues that because dividends are 
taxed twice, the optimal dividend policy is no dividend policy. 
 DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) point out that dividend policy matters whether or 
not market frictions, such as taxes, exist. The reason for this is one of the fundamental 
theories of finance: The value (or present value) of a firm depends on the value of its 
future cash flows. If firms were to do away with dividends, they would, in effect, be 
doing away with cash flows, and thereby, driving down the present value of the firm and 
stockholder wealth. 
1.5. Dividends, Governance, and Agency Theory 
Management determines the dividend payout policy of the firm. They elect the 
amount of the dividend as well as the timing of the distributions. It should also be noted 
that U.S. companies predominately have dispersed ownership. This means that 
management is a separate party from ownership. That being the case, dividend 
distribution policies are affected by governance and agency theory issues. 
One of the main theories for explaining why firms pay dividends, despite their 
unfavorable tax treatment and reduction of retained earnings, is the clientele theory. This 
theory states that firms pay dividends in order to attract shareholders. They will only do 
so, when they feel dividends will increase shareholder wealth.  
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Another popular and well-studied theory for explanation of dividend distributions 
is the signaling theory. This theory states that because managers are insiders, they are 
well aware of the firm’s future cash flows and earnings. Outsiders, however, do not have 
this information available when valuing the firm. Therefore, managers disseminate 
information regarding the firm’s future prospects through dividend distributions. Studies 
that examine this theory include Litner (1956), Asquith and Mullins (1983), and Fuller 
and Blau (2010). “The bird in hand” theory suggests that investors prefer dividends over 
capital gains. Once a dividend is in place, investors expect that dividend to continue into 
the future at regular intervals, whereas capital gains can be quite unpredictable.  
The third theory that explains dividend distributions is the free cash flow 
hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). This theory compliments agency theory in the governance 
literature. It states that firms that distribute dividends do so because they have excessive 
stock piles of cash. Excess cash allows managers more discretion. Agency theory states 
that managers’ interests tend to conflict with shareholder interests. Therefore, 
shareholders may not be comfortable with large amounts of free cash flow. That being 
the case, they demand free cash flow be distributed in terms of dividends. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) extend the free cash flow 
hypothesis to firms in other countries.  They find that when minority shareholders have 
strong legal protection, they pressure management to distribute dividends. In countries 
where rights of minority shareholders are not adequately protected, shareholders see 
dividend distributions as a substitute for legal protection. Hence, these shareholders 
prefer dividends over promising investment opportunities the firm may otherwise have. 
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1.6. Dividends and Retained Earnings: Growth and Financing New Projects or Extending 
Current Projects 
 The Miller and Modigliani papers focus on the idea that investment policy and 
dividend policy go hand-in-hand. Any part of net income not paid out in dividends is 
available to firms for reinvestment. However, according to Miller and Modigliani, 
dividend policy is irrelevant because whether a firm distributes earnings or reinvests them 
in the firm, the value of the firm is not affected. Their framework is, of course, a 
frictionless market. The assumptions of Miller and Modigliani’s irrelevant dividend 
policy do not hold in the real world. Firms have to contend with market imperfections 
and frictions, such as taxes, restrictions, and other costs. 
 The cost of issuing new stock and restrictions on debt covenants make internal 
financing appealing. That being the case, some companies would prefer to use retained 
earnings to finance all projects with a positive net present value. After all promising 
investment opportunities have been financed, any residual funds are used to pay 
dividends. This is known as a residual dividend policy. 
 The problem with a residual dividend policy is that once a firm has established a 
dividend, investors expect that dividend to continue into future periods, regardless of the 
earnings available after the firm’s optimal capital budget has been met. Managers would 
have to be sure that residual funds will be relatively stable in the future before initiating a 
dividend. This applies to dividend increases as well. 
As pointed out earlier, recent studies note the increase in earnings losses and the 
volatility of earnings across the cross-section of U.S. firms. According to Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), this is “the main reason that firms experience 
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large changes in excess cash.” Rather than initiate dividends, firms with volatile earnings 
and high growth opportunities are more likely to hold large cash balances. 
1.7. Description of Three Essays 
In light of all the above dimensions of dividends, the scope of this dissertation is 
dividend payment history and economic conditions as determinants of dividend payment 
for U.S. firms. We also examine whether these two factors determine dividend level 
changes for U.S. firms and American Depository Receipts. Finally, returns according to 
dividend paying status are examined for both U.S. firms and ADRs. 
The first essay is Chapter 2. It investigates the determinants of dividends and 
attempts to distinguish regular dividend paying firms from firms that do not pay cash 
dividends. We especially concentrate on the recent financial crisis to expose any changes 
in the factors that determine whether a firm pays dividends or not. We also contribute to 
the literature by investigating the possibility of the state of the economy as a factor in 
determining dividend payment. 
The second essay is Chapter 3. This essay concentrates on the determinants for a 
change in dividend levels of US based stocks. Previous literature finds that managers rely 
on past dividend levels to determine dividend distributions, and they are reluctant to 
increase the dividend for the sake of being conservative. They will only change dividends 
if they feel current increases in earnings are permanent. They are also reluctant to 
decrease dividends, for fear of sending a distress signal to investors. Despite this, 
dividend levels do change, although rarely. Changes (decreases, in particular) were 
especially highlighted in the financial news after the summer of 2008. We also examine 
returns associated with announcements of dividend changes. 
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The final essay is Chapter 4. It is similar to the second essay in that it also 
examines the determinants of dividend changes, as well as their effects on returns. 
However, this essay concentrates on American Depository Receipts. We expect the 
determinants of dividend changes to be different from those of US based firms, possibly 
including other factors. As far as we know, this is the first study to examine the 
determinants of dividend changes of ADRs and their effects on returns.  
The fifth and final chapter provides a comprehensive summary and conclusion of 
the essays. Limitations and possible areas of future research in these topics are also 
highlighted. These are followed by concluding remarks. 
 It should be emphasized that each of these essays is self-contained and complete. 
Each essay has its individual introduction, review of literature, and conclusion. Although 
the pieces are related, in that they are centered on the topic of dividends, they are 
considerably different. As these are stand-alone pieces, the literature review in each essay 
is particular to the issue examined within that essay. Therefore, it is not necessary to 
provide a general literature review. To that extent, the next chapter moves directly to the 
first essay. 
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CHAPTER 2: DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND PAYMENT 
2.1. Introduction 
The recent market downturn was followed by announcements of firms reducing or 
suspending dividends. Previous literature has attempted to identify factors that determine 
whether a firm pays dividends or not. 
Recent studies find evidence of cash dividend payments disappearing (Fama and 
French, 2001; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 2000). Reasons for the declining 
number of dividend paying firms include the higher volatility of earnings, increases in 
frequency and magnitude of losses, and an increase in new listings (Hayn, 1995; Fama 
and French, 2000). 
Firms that still pay dividends tend to be large and profitable (Fama and French, 
2001). DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) detect a positive relation between 
profitability and the propensity to pay dividends. Denis and Obosov (2008) also find a 
positive relation between the probability of paying dividends and profitability, as well as 
firm size. 
Reasons for paying dividends are not unanimously agreed upon in the literature. 
Three theories as to why firms pay dividends exist: the catering theory, the lifecycle 
theory, and the signaling theory. Until recently, these theories were competing theories. 
Fuller and Blau (2010) are able to reconcile the lifecycle theory and the signaling theory. 
They conclude that profitable firms with excess cash tend to pay dividends, but firms that 
are healthy, yet intermediate performers pay even higher dividends in order to signal that 
they are healthy firms. 
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The determinants of dividend payment identified by previous research as well as 
the results and conclusions in Fuller and Blau (2010) are of interest considering the recent 
developments in the economy. The NBER concluded that in December 2007, the United 
States entered a recession. In the months that followed, news reports announced various 
firm financial problems, dividend reductions, dividend suspensions, bank takeovers, and 
the downfall of many prominent firms. Have the determinants that Denis and Obosov 
(2008) identified changed? Did healthy firms attempt to signal by paying dividends even 
after the market downturn? 
This study attempts to answer those questions by identifying dividend paying 
determinants before and during the market downturn. The remainder of this chapter is 
organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the previous literature associated with dividend 
distributions and determinants. Section 2.3 discusses the data available for our study. 
Section 2.4 discusses the methodology. Section 2.5 discusses the results, and Section 2.6 
summarizes and concludes.  
2.2. Literature Review 
One of the fundamental valuation techniques taught in finance courses is 
Gordon’s Dividend Growth Model. According to this model, we can determine the 
present value of common stock by discounting the future dividends of the firm in 
question. It would seem then, that firms would distribute dividends regularly, but as 
recent literature points out, regular dividend paying firms have substantially declined in 
numbers (Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 2000). Using data 
on publicly listed U.S. firms from the Compustat database for the period between 1980 
and 2005, Skinner (2008) finds that only 345 firms paid regular dividends. The data 
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shows that the number of firms that only pay dividends (make no repurchases) fell from 
13% to 7% of firms (p 583).  
The literature has attempted to link the probability of paying dividends to various 
firm specific factors. Some argue that a large share of minority shareholders increases the 
probability of dividend payments (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
2000). Others point to a positive relation between earnings and dividends (DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner, 1992). Firm size has also been found to be positively related to 
dividend payments (Fama and Fernch, 2001; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2006; 
Denis and Obosov 2008). In the Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) survey, 
firm mangers admit that past dividend levels, not target dividend ratios, are used in 
determining the firm’s dividend distribution policy. Firms that regularly pay dividends 
continue to do so because they have a long history of doing so, and therefore feel an 
obligation to regularly distribute dividends. 
Theories that relate to the propensity to pay dividends include the catering or 
clientele theory, the cash flow or life cycle theory, and the signaling theory. Support and 
evidence against each theory exists in the literature. 
The catering theory states that the demands of the shareholders influence the 
company’s policies (Baker and Wurlger, 2004). It asserts that firms cater to their 
investors when determining dividend distribution policies. Support for this theory is 
evident in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000). Li and Lee (2006) 
extend the study by Baker and Wurgler (2004) by providing some evidence (albeit weak) 
that managers’ decisions regarding dividend increases and decreases are influenced by a 
dividend premium. They concede that the catering theory cannot fully explain dividend 
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policies. The majority of the recent literature refutes the catering theory. For example, 
most studies note the decline in dividend paying firms, which is evidence that firms are 
not catering to a particular group of investors. 
Skinner (2008) investigates the relationship between earnings and repurchases, 
and finds that while this relationship has strengthened over time, the relationship between 
earnings and cash dividends has weakened. He observes that firms that exclusively pay 
dividends are almost non-existent. Rather than pay regular dividends, many firms make 
repurchases, probably due to their flexibility. Most firms that still pay regular dividends 
also use repurchases.  
The life cycle theory (sometimes referred to as the cash flow theory) states that 
mature firms are more likely to pay dividends, while younger firms are not. As firms 
become mature, they tend to become more profitable, yet they have less growth 
opportunities, which leaves them with large cash balances. If excess cash is not paid out 
as dividends, mangers are granted more discretion, which shareholders may not be 
comfortable with. Therefore, mature firms will distribute dividends to minimize excess 
cash. On the other hand, young firms tend to be less profitable and have more growth 
opportunities, so any cash they do have will be utilized for investment and growth.  
Fama and French (2001) find evidence to support the life cycle theory. They 
observe that dividends tend to be paid by profitable firms with low growth rates, while 
less profitable firms with higher growth rates tend to retain earnings. DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) also support the life cycle hypothesis and refute the clientele 
and signaling theories. They measure profitability as the ratio of retained earnings to total 
equity and the ratio of retained earnings to total assets, arguing that these longer term 
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measures of profitability are better determinants (than short term measures) of the 
propensity to pay dividends. Using logistic regressions, and controlling size, growth, 
dividend history, and other factors, they find strong evidence that RE/TE and RE/TA are 
indeed positively related with the probability of dividend payment.  
Denis and Obosov (2008) identify determinants of dividends on an international 
level. They use data from Worldscope, and the available data limits their study to 
developed countries. Using a logistic model, they find that the propensity to pay 
dividends is positively related to size and profitability, but negatively related to growth 
opportunities. The results in Denis and Obosov (2008) also support the lifecycle or cash 
flow theory of dividend distributions. 
The signaling theory states that firms that pay high dividends do so in order to 
signal to investors that the firm’s future cash flows have increased (Healy and Palepu, 
1988). A decrease in dividends should be interpreted as evidence that the firm’s future 
cash flows have decreased (Miller and Rock, 1985). Managers have insider information 
regarding the firm’s future prospects, and they use dividend announcements as a method 
of providing investors with that information. The non-monotonic relation between 
earnings and dividends observed in previous studies served as evidence against the 
signaling theory. 
Recently, Fuller and Blau (2010) have been able to provide evidence that 
reconciles the cash flow and signaling theories. They are able to justify the non-
monotonic relationship between firm performance and dividend payment that previous 
papers have used to refute the signaling theory. They explain that good performers pay a 
dividend because they may have excess cash and not enough profitable investment 
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opportunities. Poor performers pay small dividends, but intermediate performers show 
evidence of signaling. Intermediate performers that are actually healthy firms pay 
dividends higher than dividends of good performers in order to distinguish themselves 
from unhealthy intermediate performers. 
2.3. Data 
The data for this study is available from the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases. 
From the CRSP database we are able to gather dividend record dates for firms trading on 
the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges. Firms are identified as dividend payers, 
non-dividend payers, and “switcher” firms based on their dividend paying history in the 
previous twelve quarters. Firms identified as dividend payers have paid a regular, 
quarterly, cash dividend in all of the previous twelve quarters. We identify these 
distributions using the CRSP database code “1232.” Firms that have not paid a single 
regular, quarterly, cash dividend in the previous twelve quarters are labeled as non-
dividend payers. Switcher firms are those that paid regular, quarterly, cash dividends 
within the previous twelve quarters, but did not distribute dividends in every quarter. 
Most of our data for this study is available from the COMPUSTAT database. 
From this database, we gather data on fundamental, firm specific variables that may be 
used to explain a firm’s dividend paying status. Data gathered from the COMPUSTAT 
database includes firm market value, operating income after depreciation, net income, 
book value of assets, retained earnings, and book value of equity. 
The study period ranges from 1993 through 2009 (covering 19 years), but data is 
gathered from 1990 through 2009 in order to determine the dividend paying status of 
each firm as explained above. During our study period, the world markets experienced a 
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boom and a small crash due to tech stocks in the early 2000s, as well as a severe 
recession (which began in December 2007, according to NBER) that may have affected 
dividend paying status. We attempt to find changes in dividend paying status associated 
with these events, by including a variable to control for the state of the economy.  Such a 
variable can be proxied by various measures, such as the S&P 500 Index, GDP, and 
NBER classifications of economic expansions and contractions. 
In order to assess whether the market conditions influence dividend payment, we 
examine these three different indicators of market conditions. 
The definition of a recession is two or more consecutive quarters of a decline in 
GDP. Data on GDP is available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This measure 
may not be satisfactory to some because it does not factor in other items such as 
unemployment and other market conditions.  
The NBER uses a more broadly defined measure of recession. “The NBER does 
not define a recession in terms of two consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP. 
Rather, a recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the 
economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, 
employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales” (US Business Cycles and 
Contractions, NBER). According to the NBER, economic contractions in the United 
States include the time period between March 2001 and November 2001, as well as the 
period between December 2007 and June 2009.  
Finally we examine whether the return on the S&P 500 Index affects the dividend 
payment policies of firms in the following quarter.  
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Each dividend announcement is classified according to whether it occurred during 
an economic recession or expansion according to the NBER, as well as the dividend 
paying status of the particular firm.  
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for variables that previous literature 
associates with dividend payment. We also include the quarterly return on the S&P 500 
Index. Mean, Median, Minimum, and Maximum statistics are provided.  
Total Assets, which we use as a measure of firm size, is considerably higher at 
$11,474 million for firms that regularly pay dividends, as compared to “switcher” firms 
with average Total Assets of $5,654 million and non-dividend paying firms with average 
Total Assets of $1,343 million. We use Total Assets as our measure of size, rather than 
market capitalization, because market capitalization is equal to the price of the stock 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. We are attempting to single out the 
relation between economic conditions and the probability that a firm will pay a dividend. 
Using market capitalization may cause confounding results because it is influenced by 
price, which will be relatively high during market expansions and relatively low during 
recessions. 
Our first measure of growth opportunity is measured as “the ratio of the market 
value of total capital (book value of total assets – book value of equity + market value of 
equity) to the book value of total assets (Vt/At)” (Denis and Obosov, 2008, p 64). We will 
henceforth refer to this measure as “Growth Opportunities 1.” This measure of growth 
opportunity implies that non-dividend payers, on average, have higher growth 
opportunities than both dividend payers and switchers. This supports the cash flow 
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Non-Dividend Paying, Dividend Paying, and Switcher Firms, 
1993Q1 – 2009Q2 
 
The S&P 500 Qtr. Return is the Quarterly return on the S&P 500 Index. The Total Assets are reported in 
millions of US dollars and are equal to the book value of total assets. Growth Opportunities 1 is calculated 
as the ratio of the market value of total capital to the book value of total assets ((book value of total assets-
book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets). Growth Opportunities 2 is 
calculated as the percent change in assets over the quarter. Earned Equity is calculated as ratio of retained 
earnings to the book value of equity. Profitability 1 is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest to 
the book value of total assets. Profitability 2 is calculated as the ratio of after-tax earnings to the book value 
of equity. Firms are identified as non-dividend payers if they have not paid a regular cash dividend 
(distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the last 12 quarters. Firms are identified as 
dividend payers if they paid a regular cash dividend in the previous 12 quarters. If a firm has paid dividends 
irregularly within the most recent 12 quarters, it is identified as a “Switcher” firm. 
    Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Variable Nonpayer 
S&P 500 Qtr. Return 0.02 0.02 -0.23 0.21 
Total Assets 1,343.18 84.47 0 2,363,878 
Growth Opportunities 1 2.70 0.98 0 12,900 
Growth Opportunities 2 -20,346.42 -0.01 -872,408,000 20.23 
Earned Equity -9.69 -0.04 -193,778.43 776.98 
Profitability 1 -0.05 0 -2,132 486 
Profitability 2 -0.28 0.01 -8,652.75 2,202 
    
  Payer 
S&P 500 Qtr. Return 0.02 0.02 -0.23 0.21 
Total Assets 11,474.34 1,359.01 0.01 2,358,266 
Growth Opportunities 1 0.97 0.56 0 454.87 
Growth Opportunities 2 -70.85 0 -2,366,619 0.36 
Earned Equity 0.30 0.65 -5,459 7,665.12 
Profitability 1 0.01 0.01 -8.33 33.84 
Profitability 2 0.09 0.03 -1,531.50 1,023.67 
    
  Switcher 
S&P 500 Qtr. Return 0.02 0.02 -0.23 0.21 
Total Assets 5,654.43 658.58 0.02 1,888,599 
Growth Opportunities 1 0.84 0.44 0.00 323.50 
Growth Opportunities 2 -27.83 0 -1,009,032 0.21 
Earned Equity -0.38 0.49 -12,331 116.88 
Profitability 1 0.01 0 -8.44 10.05 
Profitability 2   0.15 0.03 -260.00 5,395 
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hypothesis and suggests that mature firms pay dividends because reinvestment 
opportunities may not provide enough creation of wealth. Shareholders of these firms 
value distribution of earnings rather than reinvestment in mediocre activities. Non-
dividend payers, on the other hand, have reinvestment and growth opportunities that 
maximize shareholder wealth. 
The second measure of growth opportunity is measured as the percentage change 
in assets over the quarter (dAt/At). We will henceforth refer to this measure of growth 
opportunities as “Growth Opportunities 2.” 
Earned Equity is measured as the ratio of retained earnings to book value of 
equity. In line with intuition, earned equity in the prior quarter tends to be higher for 
firms that have consistently distributed dividends over the previous twelve quarters.  This 
supports the notion that firms with large cash reserves tend to be dividend payers. Non-
dividend payers have negative earned equity on average. This implies that on average 
their retained earnings are negative. Their equity may arise from raising capital through 
stock issues. This is common for young firms. 
We also employ the two measures of profitability noted in Denis and Obosov 
(2008). The first measure of profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings before 
interest to the book value of total assets. We will refer to this measure of profitability as 
“Profitability 1.” Profitability1 is higher for dividend payers and switchers, on average. 
Non-dividend payers have negative profitability, again indicating that average earnings 
are negative for non-dividend payers and implying that these firms may be young firms. 
The second measure of profitability is measured as the ratio of after-tax earnings 
to the book value of equity. We will refer to this measure of profitability as “Profitability 
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2.” Switcher firms have the highest value for Profitability2, with dividend payers close 
behind. Non-dividend payers have negative profitability using this measure, which 
verifies the results using Profitability1. Switcher firms and dividend paying firms have 
very similar means and medians of profitability. Despite the similarity in means and 
medians, switcher firms have a much wider distribution in profitability regardless of the 
measure used. This wide distribution may explain why switcher firms are not regular 
dividend payers. 
Table 2 introduces the importance of market conditions. It displays summary 
statistics for determinants of dividend payment according the firms’ dividend paying 
status, as well as the economic cycle, as determined by the NBER. It is a well-accepted 
fact that financial markets tend to increase in value over the long run; so naturally, there 
are more observations during expansion periods, as opposed to recession periods.  
Confirming intuition, the S&P 500 has a negative average quarterly return for all 
types of firms during recession periods, but a positive average quarterly return for all 
types of firms during expansionary periods. Total assets are also higher, on average, for 
all firms during expansionary periods and lower during recession periods. 
Growth opportunities seem to be higher for non-dividend payers and dividend 
payers during recessions, while lower for switchers in recessions. This may be due to the 
fact that some firms classified as switchers may be firms that discontinued dividend 
payments during the twelve quarter classification period. On average, Growth 
Opportunities 2 seems inappropriate as all means are negative and variability is extremely 
large. 
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During expansionary periods, the average quarterly earned equity of the prior 
period for dividend payers is positive, but it highly negative for non-dividend payers, and 
slightly negative for switchers. Prior to periods labeled as recessionary, average quarterly 
earned equity is positive and higher for dividend payers, positive for switchers, but 
negative for non-dividend payers.  
On average, Profitability is highest for firms classified as dividend payers, and is 
slightly higher in recession periods. On the other hand, average Profitability is lowest, 
and negative, for firms classified as non-dividend payers, and is slightly more negative in 
recession periods. Average profitability is slightly lower, but still remains positive for 
switcher firms. 
Profitability 2 has similar implications as the first profitability measure in regards 
to dividend payers and non-dividend payers. Implications for switcher firms differ 
slightly. Switcher firms have slightly higher average profitability during recessions, when 
using the second profitability measure. 
2.4. Methodology 
The logistic model is a nonparametric procedure, so it is not restricted to many of 
the assumptions of parametric procedures. The data does not have to be “normally 
distributed, linearly related or of equal variance within each group” (Sheskin, 2007). The 
logistic regression assumes that observations in an analysis are independent of one 
another.  Logistic regressions also require a large sample, according to Wright (1995), 
because small samples can lead to inaccurate coefficients that have high standard errors. 
The logistic model is also appropriate here because a binary logistic model can be
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Table 2 
 
Univariate Statistics According to Dividend Paying Status and Economic Cycle 
 
The S&P 500 Qtr. Return is the Quarterly return on the S&P 500 Index. The Total Assets are reported in millions of US dollars and are equal to the book 
value of total assets. Growth Opportunities 1 is calculated as the ratio of the market value of total capital to the book value of total assets ((book value of 
total assets-book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets). Growth Opportunities 2 is calculated as the percent change in assets 
over the quarter. Earned Equity is calculated as ratio of retained earnings to the book value of equity. Profitability 1 is calculated as the ratio of earnings 
before interest to the book value of total assets. Profitability 2 is calculated as the ratio of after-tax earnings to the book value of equity. Firms are identified 
as non-dividend payers if they have not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the last 12 quarters. Firms are 
identified as dividend payers if they paid a regular cash dividend in the previous 12 quarters. If a firm has paid dividends irregularly within the most recent 
12 quarters, it is identified as a “Switcher” firm. A quarter is labeled as expansion or recession if it is classified as such by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. According to the NBER recessions occurred between March 2001 and November 2001 and between December 2007 and June 2009. 
 
    Expansion   Recession 
  Nonpayer Nonpayer 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
S&P 500 Qtr. Return 0.031 0.029 -0.176 0.209 -0.068 -0.099 -0.226 0.152 
Total Assets 1,288 80 0 2,363,878 1,728 127 0 1,097,188 
Growth Opportunities 1 2.65 1.00 0.00 12,900.00 3.00 0.84 0.00 9,467.15 
Growth Opportunities 2 -21,196.1 -0.006 -8.72E+08 20.226 -14,446.4 -0.003 -252,708,531 4.579 
Earned Equity -9.298 -0.028 -92,317 776.982 -12.365 -0.109 -193,778.426 99.821 
Profitability 1 -0.049 0.003 -2132 486 -0.055 0.000 -99.429 13 
Profitability 2 -0.285 0.010 -8,652.750 2202 -0.207 0.002 -540 1,499.741 
    
  Payer Payer 
S&P 500 Qtr. Return 0.036 0.031 -0.176 0.209 -0.067 -0.089 -0.226 0.152 
Total Assets 10,483 1,279 0 2,254,394 17,436 2,017 1 2,358,266 
Growth Opportunities 1 0.96 0.57 0.00 454.87 1.05 0.48 0.00 367.24 
Growth Opportunities 2 -82.217 0.000 -2,366,619 0.359 -2.501 0.000 -3,453.633 0.033 
Earned Equity 0.116 0.645 -5,459 1,518.667 1.417 0.649 -63.622 7,665.115 
Profitability 1 0.013 0.008 -8.326 33.842 0.015 0.005 -1.054 12.488 
Profitability 2   0.094 0.031 -1,531.500 1023.667   0.084 0.025 -388.731 279.160 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Univariate Statistics According to Dividend Paying Status and Economic Cycle 
 
    Expansion   Recession 
  Switcher Switcher 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
S&P 500 Qtr. Return 0.034 0.025 -0.137 0.209 -0.066 -0.099 -0.226 0.152 
Total Assets 5,388 621 0 1,888,599 7,467 949 1 953,427 
Growth Opportunities 1 0.85 0.45 0.00 323.50 0.73 0.37 0.00 49.76 
Growth Opportunities 2 -31.785 0.000 -1,009,032 0.209 -0.910 0.000 -1,942.323 0.140 
Earned Equity -0.452 0.492 -12,331 116.883 0.112 0.493 -524.962 36.743 
Profitability 1 0.009 0.005 -8.443 10.048 0.006 0.003 -1.046 1.131 
Profitability 2   0.032 0.027 -260 254.3862   0.930 0.022 -19.767 5,395 
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employed so that the dependent variable is comprised of two categories. It allows for 
computation of a probability that will always fall between 0 and 1.  
2.5. Empirical Results 
 The purpose of this essay is to determine the probability that a firm will or will not 
make a dividend payment. We expect that factors noted as significant in other related 
studies, such as the firms profitability, earnings, and size, will be significant in 
determining whether a firm will pay dividends or not.  
Previous research, surveys in particular, point out that managers are reluctant to 
change dividend payment policies. These surveys note a general feeling of obligation to 
continue dividend payments for firms that have historically paid dividends. As such, we 
believe a firm’s recent dividend paying history largely determines whether a firm will or 
will not pay a dividend in the coming quarter.  
The recent recession and financial troubles of firms worldwide also highlights 
another factor that may be important in determining the probability that a firm will 
announce a dividend payment or not: market conditions. 
As noted above, dividend paying history and market conditions have never before 
been studied as possible determinants for cash distribution policies. 
Because the focus of this essay is on the likelihood of a specific outcome, a 
dividend distribution, or lack thereof, we find it appropriate to employ a binary logistic 
regression. In particular, we model the probability that a firm will not pay a dividend. If a 
firm does not pay a dividend, the dependent variable will be equal to 1. If a firm pays a 
dividend, the dependent variable will be equal to 0. 
The null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis are stated below: 
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H0: Dividend non-payment cannot be predicted by firm profitability, earnings, size, 
dividend payment history, or market conditions. 
HA: Dividend non-payment can be predicted by firm profitability, earnings, size, and 
dividend payment history, as well as market conditions. 
Table 3 tabulates the number for cases where a firm did or did not pay a dividend 
according to the firms’ dividend paying status and the economic climate during the 
dividend announcement. This table highlights the importance of dividend paying history 
in determining whether a firm will or will not pay a dividend.  Financial markets tend to 
expand over the long run, so naturally there are more quarters labeled as expansionary by 
the NBER. According to the NBER, between 1993 and 2009, recessions occurred from 
March 2001 through November 2001 and December 2007 through June 2009. Therefore, 
our sample has ten quarters labeled as recession quarters. During recessions, most non-
dividend paying firms continue to not pay dividends. In only 0.4% of cases between 1993 
and 2009, did non-dividend paying firms begin to pay dividends. In the other extreme, 
dividend payers continued to pay dividends through recessions in 96.88% of instances, 
with dividends being omitted or suspended only 3.12% of the time. Switchers distributed 
dividends in 74.31% of cases, but did not distribute dividends 25.69% of the time. 
In expansionary periods, non-dividend paying firms are a little more likely 
(1.53% of cases) to initiate dividend payments. For the most part, however, they continue 
as non-dividend payers. A high number of dividend payers continue to pay dividends 
(96.37% of cases), but in 3.63% instances, a dividend payer omitted or suspended 
dividend payments. Switchers see the most difference between expansions and 
recessions. This may be because their earnings and profitability have higher volatility as  
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Table 3 
 
Number of Instances when Firms Paid or Did Not Pay a Dividend According to Dividend Paying Status and Economic Cycle 
 
Firms are identified as non-dividend payers if they have not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the last 12 
quarters. Firms are identified as dividend payers if they paid a regular cash dividend in the previous 12 quarters. If a firm has paid dividends irregularly 
within the most recent 12 quarters, it is identified as a “Switcher” firm. Once classified by its previous 12 quarters, it is determined if a firm paid a dividend 
or not in the next quarter. If the firm paid a dividend in the next quarter, that instance is counted in the “Paid” column, whereas if a firm did not pay a 
dividend in the next quarter, that instance is counted in the “Did not Pay” column. A quarter is labeled as expansion or recession if it is classified as such by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research. According to the NBER recessions occurred between March 2001 and November 2001 and between December 
2007 and June 2009. 
 
  Recession   Expansion 
  Paid Did not Pay Total Paid Did Not Pay Total 
Nonpayer 154 0.40% 38,475 99.60% 38,629 100% 4,103 1.53% 264,065 98.47% 268,168 100% 
Payer 10,099 96.88% 325 3.12% 10,424 100% 60,410 96.37% 2,275 3.63% 62,685 100% 
Switcher 5,121 74.31%   1,770 25.69%   6,891 100%   37,073 79.12%   9,785 20.88%   46,858 100% 
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seen in Tables 1 and 2. In expansionary periods, switcher firms paid dividends 79.12% of 
the time, while skipping dividends in 20.88% of cases. 
In order to determine whether the factors such as earnings, profitability, growth 
opportunities, dividend paying history, and market conditions can predict dividend non-
payment in a particular quarter, we use forward selection. Forward selection allows for 
variables to be added to the model one by one to determine if the factor is significant and 
contributes to the model. This is useful as we have two measures of profitability and 
growth opportunity, and three different measures of economic conditions. 
The first model we test is  
 Pr	ሺܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௧ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܰ݋݊݌ܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଶܲܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଷܧݔ݌ܽ݊ݏ݅݋݊ ൅ ߚସܰ݋݊݌ܽݕ݁ݎ ∗ 
 ܧݔ݌ܽ݊ݏ݅݋݊௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହܲܽݕ݁ݎ ∗ ܧݔ݌ܽ݊ݏ݅݋݊௧ିଵ ൅	ߚ଺ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௧ିଵ ൅ 
 	ߚ଻ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄ܱ݌݌݋ݎݐݑ݊݅ݐݕ1௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ1௧ିଵ	 (1) 
The Status effect is represented by the two binary variables: Nonpayer and Payer. 
The binary variable “Nonpayer” is equal to 1 if the firm has not paid a regular cash 
dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the previous 12 
quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if the 
firm has paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in 
all of the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. We measure the effect of the 
market according to the expansions and contractions defined by the NBER. The 
Economic Cycle effect is introduced as a binary variable called Expansion that is equal to 
1 if the market is in an expansionary quarter and 0 when the market is in a contraction or 
recession period. Total Assets is the book value of total assets in the prior quarter. 
Growth Opportunities 1 is calculated as the ratio of the market value of total capital to the 
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book value of total assets ((book value of total assets-book value of equity + market value 
of equity)/book value of total assets) in the prior quarter. Profitability 1 is calculated as 
the ratio of earnings before interest to the book value of total assets in the prior quarter.  
Each variable is added to the model one by one. Panels 1 through 4 of Table 4 
display the results of the forward selection process. According to Panel 1, remarkable 
improvements are made in the prediction of non-payment by including the variables in 
Equation 1. The Likelihood Ratio, the Schwarz Criterion, and the Akaike Information 
Criterion improve from 489,666; 486,669; and 486,679, respectively, when only the 
intercept is included to 116,893; 116,911; and 116,911, respectively, when the variables 
in equation 1 are included.  
Panel 2 displays a type 3 analysis of effects based on the Wald test. All of the 
variables in equation 1 are statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that these 
factors affect dividend non-payment in the coming quarter.  In fact, all effects, except 
Growth Opportunity, are significant at the 0.01% level. Another interesting result, is the 
statistical significance of the Status*EconomicCycle interaction effect. This indicates 
evidence that economic cycles affect dividend paying, non-dividend paying, and switcher 
firms differently. 
Panel 3 displays the parameter estimates for Equation 1. The ExpEst column 
contains the exponentiated parameter estimates, which represent the odds ratios for the 
variables. If the figure in Estimate column is positive, the odds ratio indicates “the 
amount of increase in the Log odds for a one-unit increase in the predictor variable” 
(Sheskin, 2007, p 1596). If the Estimate is negative, then the odds ratio is the amount of 
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Table 4 
 
Forward Selection Procedure With Growth Opportunities 1 and Profitability 1 and NBER Market Measure 
 
The probability modeled is that Payment = ‘No’. There were 309,742 instances between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2010 in which 
firms did not pay a dividend. There were 111,420 instances between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2010 in which firms paid a dividend. 
Using a binary logit model and Fisher’s scoring optimizing technique, variables are selected using forward selection process. The Status effect is represented 
by the two binary variables: Nonpayer and Payer. The binary variable “Nonpayer” is equal to 1 if the firm has not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution 
code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if the firm has 
paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in all of the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. We measure 
the effect of the market according to the expansion and contractions defined by the NBER. The Economic Cycle effect is introduced as a binary variable 
called Expansion that is equal to 1 if the market is in an expansionary quarter and 0 when the market is in a contraction or recession period. Total Assets is 
the book value of total assets in the prior quarter. Growth Opportunities 1 is calculated as the ratio of the market value of total capital to the book value of 
total assets ((book value of total assets-book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets) in the prior quarter. Profitability 1 is 
calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest to the book value of total assets in the prior quarter.  
 
Panel 1: Fit Statistics 
Step -2 Log L AIC SC 
0    486,666.46           486,668           486,679  
1    117,619.38     117,625.38     117,658.23  
2    117,373.39     117,381.39     117,425.20  
3    117,088.93     117,100.93     117,166.64  
4    117,047.78     117,061.78     117,138.44  
5    116,934.43     116,950.43     117,038.03  
6    116,893.22     116,911.22     117,009.77  
Panel 2:Type 3 Analysis of Effects with Effect Coding 
Effect DF Wald ChiSq 
Prob 
ChiSq 
Status 2 24462.5396 <.0001 
Economic Cycle 1 213.8736 <.0001 
Status*Economic Cycle 2 215.2143 <.0001 
Total Assets 1 36.7924 <.0001 
Growth Opportunities 1 1 126.6917 <.0001 
Profitability 1 1 116.8697 <.0001 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Forward Selection Procedure With Growth Opportunities 1 and Profitability 1 and NBER Market Measure 
 
 
Panel 3: Type 3 Parameter Estimates with Effect Coding 
Variable ClassVal0 ClassVal1 DF Estimate StdErr  Wald ChiSq  
Prob 
ChiSq ExpEst 
Intercept 1 0.0795*** 0.0188            17.88  <.0001 1.083 
Status Nonpayer 1 4.7417*** 0.0309    23,577.36  <.0001 114.626 
Status Payer 1 -3.4546*** 0.0255    18,328.36  <.0001 0.032 
Economic Cycle Expansion 1 -0.268*** 0.0183          213.87  <.0001 0.765 
Status*Economic Cycle Nonpayer Expansion 1 -0.4401*** 0.0308          203.79  <.0001 0.644 
Status*Economic Cycle Payer Expansion 1 0.3313*** 0.0255          168.80  <.0001 1.393 
Total Assets 1 -1.46E-06*** 2.42E-07            36.79  <.0001 1 
Growth Opportunities 1 1 0.039*** 0.00347          126.69  <.0001 1.04 
Profitability 1     1 -0.0894*** 0.00827          116.87  <.0001 0.914 
Panel 4: Type 3 Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect OddsRatioEst LowerCL UpperCL 
Total Assets 1 1 1 
Growth Opportunities 1 1.04 1.033 1.047 
Profitability1 0.914 0.9 0.929 
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decrease in the Log odds attributable to a one-unit increase in the predictor variable. The 
odds ratios are also displayed in Panel 4 for non-categorical variables. 
These results indicate that a firm classified as a non-payer, based on its lack of 
dividend distributions over the previous twelve quarters, is 114.63% more likely to not 
pay a dividend in the coming quarter during a recession. On the other hand, if the market 
is in an expansionary period, a non-dividend paying firm is 0.64% less likely to continue 
its non-dividend paying course. A dividend paying firm is 0.032% less likely to not pay a 
dividend over a switcher firm during a recession. This is relatively intuitive, since 
previous literature has noted managers’ reluctance to change distribution policies, and 
discontinuation of dividend payments during a recession can be extremely damaging to a 
firm.  
Seemingly counterintuitive, a dividend paying firm is 1.393% more likely to omit 
a dividend payment during an expansion, as opposed to a recession. This may be 
explainable if we take previous literature into account. If managers forecast that earnings 
cannot keep up with cash distributions, they may use an economic expansionary period 
(when bad news may be less damaging) to announce dividend suspensions. This new and 
counterintuitive finding has not previously been noted in other studies 
During an expansion, a switcher firm is 0.765% less likely to omit a dividend. 
This is also intuitive. It is likely that many of these switcher firms began paying 
dividends in the recent past, or have a pattern of sporadic dividend payments. Table 1 
also noted greater variability in profitability for switcher firms. Therefore, they are more 
likely to pay dividends, and less likely to omit or discontinue dividends, during an 
economic expansion. 
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If a firm experiences a one unit increase in total assets, it is 1% less likely to not 
pay a dividend compared to a firm whose asset size did not change. Profitability also 
shows similar evidence. A one unit increase in profitability implies that a firm is 0.014% 
less likely to not pay a dividend. These results support previous literature, where large 
size and profitability have been linked with dividend payment. On the other hand, a one 
unit increase in growth opportunities increases the likelihood that a firm will not pay a 
dividend in the coming quarter by 1.04%. This is also intuitive and supports previous 
literature. Firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to retain earnings for 
reinvestment, rather than distribute them in the form of dividends. 
The second model we test is  
 Pr	ሺܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௧ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܰ݋݊݌ܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଶܲܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଷܲܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߚସܰ݋݊݌ܽݕ݁ݎ ∗ ܧݔ݌ܽ݊ݏ݅݋݊௧ିଵ ൅ 
 ߚହܲܽݕ݁ݎ ∗ ܧݔ݌ܽ݊ݏ݅݋݊௧ିଵ ൅	ߚ଺ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௧ିଵ ൅ 
 ߚ଻ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄ܱ݌݌݋ݎݐݑ݊݅ݐݕ1௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ1௧ିଵ	  (2) 
The Status effect is represented by the two binary variables: Nonpayer and Payer. 
The binary variable “Nonpayer” is equal to 1 if the firm has not paid a regular cash 
dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the previous 12 
quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if the 
firm has paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in 
all of the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. We measure the effect of the 
market according to the standard definition of a recession. The Economic Cycle effect is 
introduced as a binary variable called Expansion that is equal to 1 if GDP has not 
declined for two or more consecutive quarters, and 0 otherwise. Total Assets is the book 
value of total assets in the prior quarter. Growth Opportunities 1 is calculated as the ratio 
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of the market value of total capital to the book value of total assets ((book value of total 
assets-book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets) in the 
prior quarter. Profitability 1 is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest to the 
book value of total assets in the prior quarter. 
Each variable is added to the model one by one. Panels 1 through 5 of Table 5 
display the results of the forward selection process. The Likelihood Ratio, the Schwarz 
Criterion, and the Akaike Information Criterion improve from 486,667; 486,668; and 
486,679, respectively, when only the intercept is included to 117,580; 117,588; and 
117,632, respectively, once the forward selection process is complete. 
Panel 2 displays Type 3 analysis of effects based on the Wald test. Of the five 
variables in Model 2, only dividend paying Status and Size, proxied by Total Assets, 
significantly contribute to a firm’s lack of payment in the coming quarter. In this model, 
dividend paying history is an important determinant of dividend payment, but the state of 
the economy is not. This may be due to the fact that this model defines an economic 
recession as two or more consecutive declines in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This 
definition does not include other pertinent information such as unemployment or 
consumer confidence, which also contribute to overall market conditions. 
Panel 4 displays odds ratios for the statistically significant variables in Model 2. 
According to this model, a non-dividend payer is 265% more likely to omit a dividend 
than a switcher firm. A dividend payer is 0.136% less likely, than a switcher firm, to omit 
a dividend. As in Model 1, a one unit increase in Total Assets is associated with a 1% 
decrease in the likelihood that the firm will not pay a dividend in the coming quarter.  
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Table 5 
 
Forward Selection Procedure With Growth Opportunities 1 and Profitability 1 and GDP Market Measure 
 
The probability modeled is that Payment = ‘No’. There were 309,742 instances between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2010 in which 
firms did not pay a dividend. There were 111,420 instances between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2010 in which firms paid a dividend. 
Using a binary logit model and Fisher’s scoring optimizing technique, variables are selected using forward selection process. The Status effect is represented 
by the two binary variables: Nonpayer and Payer. The binary variable “Nonpayer” is equal to 1 if the firm has not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution 
code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if the firm has 
paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in all of the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. We measure 
the effect of the market according to the standard definition of a recession. The Economic Cycle effect is introduced as a binary variable called Expansion 
that is equal to 1 if GDP declines for two or more consecutive quarters and 0 otherwise. Total Assets is the book value of total assets in the prior quarter. 
Growth Opportunities 1 is calculated as the ratio of the market value of total capital to the book value of total assets ((book value of total assets-book value 
of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets) in the prior quarter. Profitability 1 is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest to the 
book value of total assets in the prior quarter. 
 
Panel 1: Fit Statistics 
Step -2 Log L AIC SC 
0 486666.5 486668 486679 
1 117619.4 117625.4 117658.2 
2 117580.2 117588.2 117632 
Panel 2:Type 3 Analysis of Effects with Effect Coding 
Effect DF WaldChiSq ProbChiSq 
Status 2 113633.77 <.0001 
Total Assets 1 38.4835 <.0001 
Panel 3: Type 3 Parameter Estimates with Effect Coding 
Variable ClassVal0 DF Estimate StdErr Wald ChiSq 
Prob 
ChiSq ExpEst 
Intercept 1 -0.0983*** 0.00943 108.7589 <.0001 0.906 
Status Nonpayer 1 4.3868*** 0.0131 112804.254 <.0001 80.387 
Status Payer 1 -3.1928*** 0.0151 44665.3225 <.0001 0.041 
Total Assets   1 -1.50E-06*** 2.42E-07 38.4835 <.0001 1 
Panel 4: Type 3 Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect OddsRatioEst LowerCL UpperCL 
Status       Nonpayer vs Switcher 265.305 255.554 275.429 
Status       Payer    vs Switcher 0.136 0.129 0.142 
Total Assets 1 1 1 
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Table 6 
 
Forward Selection Procedure With Growth Opportunities 1 and Profitability 1 and S&P 500 Market Measure 
 
The probability modeled is that Payment = ‘No’. There were 309,742 instances between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2010 in which 
firms did not pay a dividend. There were 111,420 instances between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2010 in which firms paid a dividend. 
Using a binary logit model and Fisher’s scoring optimizing technique, variables are selected using forward selection process. The Status effect is represented 
by the two binary variables: Nonpayer and Payer. The binary variable “Nonpayer” is equal to 1 if the firm has not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution 
code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if the firm has 
paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in all of the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. We measure 
economic conditions as the return on the S&P 500 from the previous quarter. Total Assets is the book value of total assets in the prior quarter. Growth 
Opportunities 1 is calculated as the ratio of the market value of total capital to the book value of total assets ((book value of total assets-book value of equity 
+ market value of equity)/book value of total assets) in the prior quarter. Profitability 1 is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest to the book value 
of total assets in the prior quarter. 
Panel 1: Fit Statistics 
Step -2 Log L AIC SC 
0 486666.5 486668 486679 
1 117619.4 117625.4 117658.2 
2 117489.4 117497.4 117541.2 
3 117452.1 117462.1 117516.9 
Panel 2:Type 3 Analysis of Effects with Effect Coding 
Effect DF Wald ChiSq Prob ChiSq 
Status 2    113,232.64  <.0001 
S&P 500 Qtr. Return 1            127.89  <.0001 
Total Assets 1              36.59  <.0001 
Panel 3: Type 3 Parameter Estimates with Effect Coding 
Variable ClassVal0 DF Estimate StdErr  Wald ChiSq  Prob ChiSq ExpEst 
Intercept 1 -0.1222*** 0.00967            159.51  <.0001 0.885 
Status Nonpayer 1 4.3935*** 0.0131    112,427.48  <.0001 80.921 
Status Payer 1 -3.1967*** 0.0151      44,687.38  <.0001 0.041 
S&P 500 Qtr. Return 1 1.1364*** 0.1005            127.89  <.0001 3.116 
Total Assets   1 -1.46E-06*** 2.41E-07              36.59  <.0001 1 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Forward Selection Procedure With Growth Opportunities 1 and Profitability 1 and S&P 500 Market Measure 
 
Panel 4: Type 3 Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect OddsRatioEst LowerCL UpperCL 
Status       Nonpayer vs Switcher 267.79 257.917 278.04 
Status       Payer    vs Switcher 0.135 0.129 0.142 
S&P 500 Qtr. Return 3.116 2.559 3.794 
Total Assets 1 1 1 
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The third model we test is  
 Pr	ሺܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௧ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܰ݋݊݌ܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଶܲܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଷܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐ ൅	ߚସܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௧ିଵ ൅	 
 ߚହܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄ܱ݌݌݋ݎݐݑ݊݅ݐݕ1௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ1௧ିଵ  (3) 
 
The Status effect is represented by the two binary variables: Nonpayer and Payer. 
The binary variable “Nonpayer” is equal to 1 if the firm has not paid a regular cash 
dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the previous 12 
quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if the 
firm has paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in 
all of the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. We measure economic 
conditions using the return on the S&P 500 from the previous quarter. Total Assets is the 
book value of total assets in the prior quarter. Growth Opportunities 1 is calculated as the 
ratio of the market value of total capital to the book value of total assets ((book value of 
total assets-book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets) in 
the prior quarter. Profitability 1 is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest to the 
book value of total assets in the prior quarter. 
Each variable is added to the model one by one. Panels 1 through 4 of Table 6 
display the results of the forward selection process. Of the five variables in Model 3, only 
three of them are determined to be significant using the forward selection process: Status, 
S&P 500 Return in the previous quarter and Total Assets. Although this model excludes 
factors such Profitability and Growth Opportunities, it does imply that the dividend 
paying history of a firm as well as its size and opportunities for growth are likely to 
determine whether or not the firm will make a dividend payment in the following quarter. 
Panel 3 indicates that these factors are statistically significant at the 0.01% level. 
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The fourth model we test is  
 Pr	ሺܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௧ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܰ݋݊݌ܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଶܲܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଷܧݔ݌ܽ݊ݏ݅݋݊ ൅ ߚସܰ݋݊݌ܽݕ݁ݎ ∗ 
 ܧݔ݌ܽ݊ݏ݅݋݊௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହܲܽݕ݁ݎ ∗ ܧݔ݌ܽ݊ݏ݅݋݊௧ିଵ ൅	ߚ଺ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௧ିଵ ൅ 
 	ߚ଻ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄ܱ݌݌݋ݎݐݑ݊݅ݐݕ2௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ2௧ିଵ	 (4)  
The Status effect is represented by the two binary variables: Nonpayer and Payer. 
The binary variable “Nonpayer” is equal to 1 if the firm has not paid a regular cash 
dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the previous 12 
quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if the 
firm has paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in 
all of the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. We measure the effect of the 
market according to the expansion and contractions defined by the NBER. The Economic 
Cycle effect is introduced as a binary variable called Expansion that is equal to 1 if the 
market is in an expansionary quarter and 0 when the market is in a contraction or 
recession period. The Total Assets are reported in millions of US dollars and are equal to 
the book value of total assets. Growth Opportunities 2 is calculated as the percent change 
in assets over the quarter. Earned Equity is calculated as ratio of retained earnings to the 
book value of equity. Profitability 2 is calculated as the ratio of after-tax earnings to the 
book value of equity. 
Each variable is added to the model one by one. Panels 1 through 5 of Table 7 
display the results of the forward selection process. In this model, four of the five 
variables are selected as significant in the forward selection process. Panel 2 displays the 
Type 3 analysis of effects based on the Wald test. Status, Economic Cycle, the interaction 
term Status*Economic Cycle, and Total Assets in the previous period are determined to  
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Table 7 
 
Forward Selection Procedure With Growth Opportunities 2 and Profitability 2 and NBER Market Measure 
 
The probability modeled is that Payment = ‘No’. There were 309,742 instances between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2010 in which 
firms did not pay a dividend. There were 111,420 instances between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2010 in which firms paid a dividend. 
Using a binary logit model and Fisher’s scoring optimizing technique, variables are selected using forward selection process. The Status effect is represented 
by the two binary variables: Nonpayer and Payer. The binary variable “Nonpayer” is equal to 1 if the firm has not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution 
code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if the firm has 
paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in all of the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. We measure 
the effect of the market according to the expansion and contractions defined by the NBER. The Economic Cycle effect is introduced as a binary variable 
called Expansion that is equal to 1 if the market is in an expansionary quarter and 0 when the market is in a contraction or recession period. The Total Assets 
are reported in millions of US dollars and are equal to the book value of total assets. Growth Opportunities 2 is calculated as the percent change in assets 
over the quarter. Earned Equity is calculated as ratio of retained earnings to the book value of equity. Profitability 2 is calculated as the ratio of after-tax 
earnings to the book value of equity. 
Panel 1: Fit Statistics 
Step -2 Log L AIC SC 
0 486575.77 486578 486589 
1 117599.86 117605.86 117638.71 
2 117354.46 117362.46 117406.26 
3 117070.09 117082.09 117147.79 
4 117028.98 117042.98 117119.64 
Panel 2:Type 3 Analysis of Effects with Effect Coding 
Effect DF Wald ChiSq Prob ChiSq 
Status 2 24735.246 <.0001 
Economic Cycle 1 209.4451 <.0001 
Status*Economic Cycle 2 214.1404 <.0001 
Total Assets 1 40.6038 <.0001 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Forward Selection Procedure With Growth Opportunities 2 and Profitability 2 and NBER Market Measure 
 
Panel 3: Type 3 Parameter Estimates with Effect Coding 
Variable ClassVal0 ClassVal1 DF Estimate StdErr WaldChiSq ProbChiSq ExpEst 
Intercept 1 0.125*** 0.0184 46.2754 <.0001 1.133 
Status Nonpayer 1 4.7663*** 0.0308 23888.46 <.0001 117.481 
Status Payer 1 -3.4633*** 0.0255 18432.852 <.0001 0.031 
Economic Cycle Expansion 1 -0.2652*** 0.0183 209.4451 <.0001 0.767 
Status*Economic Cycle Nonpayer Expansion 1 -0.439*** 0.0308 202.7307 <.0001 0.645 
Status*Economic Cycle Payer Expansion 1 0.3305*** 0.0255 168.0346 <.0001 1.392 
Total Assets     1 -1.54E-06*** 2.42E-07 40.6038 <.0001 1 
Panel 4: Type 3 Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect OddsRatioEst LowerCL UpperCL 
Total Assets 1 1 1 
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be significant (at the 0.01% level) in determining whether a firm will or will not make a 
cash dividend distribution. 
Panel 3 of Table 7 displays the Type 3 parameter estimates as well as the odds 
ratios. According to the sign of the estimates and odds ratios, a non-dividend paying firm 
is 117.48% more likely to not pay a dividend than a switcher firm. On the other hand, a 
dividend paying firm is 0.031% less likely to omit a dividend. If the economy is in an 
expansionary period, switcher firms are 0.767% less likely to omit a dividend in the 
coming period. The results imply that a non-dividend paying firm is 0.645% less likely to 
omit a dividend in an expansionary period. This is not really so counterintuitive. It makes 
sense that firms that were previously non-dividend payer will initiate dividend payments 
when economic conditions are optimal and prospects look promising. 
Similar to findings in Table 4, dividend payers are 1.392% more likely to omit or 
discontinue cash dividends during an economic expansion. Reasons for this somewhat 
surprising outcome may relate to the damaging impacts of dividend omission during an 
economic recession. It may be that firms that can no longer sustain regular cash 
distributions choose to make this evident during more favorable economic times so as not 
to severely damage the firm. 
As in the other models, a one unit increase in Total Assets is 1% less likely to be 
related to a lack of dividend payment in the next period. 
The fifth model we test is  
 Pr	ሺܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௧ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܰ݋݊݌ܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଶܲܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଷܲܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߚସܰ݋݊݌ܽݕ݁ݎ ∗ ܧݔ݌ܽ݊ݏ݅݋݊௧ିଵ ൅ 
 ߚହܲܽݕ݁ݎ ∗ ܧݔ݌ܽ݊ݏ݅݋݊௧ିଵ ൅	ߚ଺ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௧ିଵ ൅ 
 	ߚ଻ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄ܱ݌݌݋ݎݐݑ݊݅ݐݕ2௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ2௧ିଵ  (5) 
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The Status effect is represented by the two binary variables: Nonpayer and Payer. 
The binary variable “Nonpayer” is equal to 1 if the firm has not paid a regular cash 
dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the previous 12 
quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if the 
firm has paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in 
all of the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. We measure the effect of the 
market according to the standard definition of a recession. The Economic Cycle effect is 
introduced as a binary variable called Expansion that is equal to 1 if GDP does not 
decline for two or more consecutive quarters and 0 otherwise. The Total Assets are 
reported in millions of US dollars and are equal to the book value of total assets. Growth 
Opportunities 2 is calculated as the percent change in assets over the quarter. Earned 
Equity is calculated as ratio of retained earnings to the book value of equity. Profitability 
2 is calculated as the ratio of after-tax earnings to the book value of equity. 
Each variable is added to the model one by one. Panels 1 through 5 of Table 8 
display the results of the forward selection process. As in Model 2, the market conditions 
proxied by two consecutive quarters of GDP decline are not significant determinants as to 
whether a cash dividend payment will be made or not. The only statistically significant 
variables found in the forward selection process are Status and Total Assets. Panel 2 
displays the Type 3 analysis of effects based on Wald tests, which indicate that Status and 
Total Assets are statistically significant at the 0.01% level. 
Panel 3 displays the parameter estimates along with the odds ratios for each 
variable. According to the signs of the parameter estimates and the odds ratios, a non-
dividend paying firm is 265.33% times more likely than a switcher to omit a dividend 
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Table 8 
 
Forward Selection Procedure With Growth Opportunities 2 and Profitability 2 and GDP Market Measure 
 
The probability modeled is that Payment = ‘No’. There were 309,742 instances between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2010 in which 
firms did not pay a dividend. There were 111,420 instances between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2010 in which firms paid a dividend. 
Using a binary logit model and Fisher’s scoring optimizing technique, variables are selected using forward selection process. The Status effect is represented 
by the two binary variables: Nonpayer and Payer. The binary variable “Nonpayer” is equal to 1 if the firm has not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution 
code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if the firm has 
paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in all of the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. We measure 
the effect of the market according to the standard definition of a recession. The Economic Cycle effect is introduced as a binary variable called Expansion 
that is equal to 1 if GDP declines for two or more consecutive quarters and 0 otherwise. The Total Assets are reported in millions of US dollars and are equal 
to the book value of total assets. Growth Opportunities 2 is calculated as the percent change in assets over the quarter. Earned Equity is calculated as ratio of 
retained earnings to the book value of equity. Profitability 2 is calculated as the ratio of after-tax earnings to the book value of equity. 
 
Panel 1: Fit Statistics 
Step -2 Log L AIC SC 
0 486575.8 486578 486589 
1 117599.9 117605.9 117638.7 
2 117560.8 117568.8 117612.6 
Panel 2:Type 3 Analysis of Effects with Effect Coding 
Effect DF Wald ChiSq Prob ChiSq 
Status 2           113,611.7 <.0001 
Total Assets 1 38.44 <.0001 
Panel 3: Type 3 Parameter Estimates with Effect Coding 
Variable ClassVal0 DF Estimate StdErr WaldChiSq ProbChiSq ExpEst 
Intercept 1 -0.0983*** 0.00943            108.68  <.0001 0.906 
Status Nonpayer 1 4.3868*** 0.0131    112,783.17  <.0001 80.384 
Status Payer 1 -3.1927*** 0.0151      44,659.26  <.0001 0.041 
Total Assets   1 -1.50E-06*** 2.42E-07              38.44  <.0001 1 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
Forward Selection Procedure With Growth Opportunities 2 and Profitability 2 and GDP Market Measure 
 
Panel 4: Type 3 Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect OddsRatioEst LowerCL UpperCL 
Status       Nonpayer vs Switcher 265.329 255.575 275.454 
Status       Payer    vs Switcher 0.136 0.13 0.142 
Total Assets 1 1 1 
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Table 9 
 
Forward Selection Procedure With Growth Opportunities 2 and Profitability 2 and S&P 500 Market Measure 
 
The probability modeled is that Payment = ‘No’. There were 309,742 instances between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2010 in which 
firms did not pay a dividend. There were 111,420 instances between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2010 in which firms paid a dividend. 
Using a binary logit model and Fisher’s scoring optimizing technique, variables are selected using forward selection process. The Status effect is represented 
by the two binary variables: Nonpayer and Payer. The binary variable “Nonpayer” is equal to 1 if the firm has not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution 
code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if the firm has 
paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in all of the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. We measure 
the effect of the market according to the return on the S&P 500 from the previous quarter. The Total Assets are reported in millions of US dollars and are 
equal to the book value of total assets. Growth Opportunities 2 is calculated as the percent change in assets over the quarter. Earned Equity is calculated as 
ratio of retained earnings to the book value of equity. Profitability 2 is calculated as the ratio of after-tax earnings to the book value of equity. 
Panel 1: Fit Statistics 
Step -2 Log L AIC SC 
0    486,575.77     486,578.00     486,589.00  
1    117,599.86     117,605.86     117,638.71  
2    117,469.48     117,477.48     117,521.28  
3    117,432.22     117,442.22     117,496.97  
Panel 2:Type 3 Analysis of Effects with Effect Coding 
Effect DF WaldChiSq ProbChiSq 
Status 2    113,209.18  <.0001 
S&P 500 Qtr. Return 1            128.29  <.0001 
Total Assets 1              36.54  <.0001 
Panel 3: Type 3 Parameter Estimates with Effect Coding 
Variable ClassVal0 DF Estimate StdErr WaldChiSq ProbChiSq ExpEst 
Intercept 1 -0.1222*** 0.00967            159.53  <.0001 0.885 
Status Nonpayer 1 4.3935*** 0.0131    112,405.06  <.0001 80.921 
Status Payer 1 -3.1966*** 0.0151      44,681.42  <.0001 0.041 
S&P 500 Qtr. Return 1 1.1383*** 0.1005            128.29  <.0001 3.121 
Total Assets   1 -1.46E-06*** 2.41E-07              36.54  <.0001 1 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Forward Selection Procedure With Growth Opportunities 2 and Profitability 2 and S&P 500 Market Measure 
 
Panel 4: Type 3 Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect OddsRatioEst LowerCL UpperCL 
Status       Nonpayer vs Switcher 267.822 257.947 278.074 
Status       Payer    vs Switcher 0.135 0.129 0.142 
S&P 500 Qtr. Return 3.121 2.563 3.801 
Total Assets 1 1 1 
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in the coming quarter. A dividend payer, on the other hand, is 0.136% less likely than a 
switcher to omit a dividend in the coming quarter.  Again, a one unit increase in total 
assets implies a 1% decrease in the likelihood that a firm will not pay a dividend. 
However, just as the previous models have shown, dividend payers are more likely to 
omit dividends during economic expansions, while nonpayers and switchers are less 
likely to omit during expansions. 
The sixth model we test is  
 Pr	ሺܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௧ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܰ݋݊݌ܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଶܲܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଷܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐ ൅ ߚସܰ݋݊݌ܽݕ݁ݎ ∗ 
 ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହܲܽݕ݁ݎ ∗ ܵ&ܲ500ܴ݁ݐ௧ିଵ ൅	ߚ଺ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௧ିଵ ൅	 
 ߚ଻ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄ܱ݌݌݋ݎݐݑ݊݅ݐݕ2௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ2௧ିଵ  (6) 
The Status effect is represented by the two binary variables: Nonpayer and Payer. 
The binary variable “Nonpayer” is equal to 1 if the firm has not paid a regular cash 
dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the previous 12 
quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if the 
firm has paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in 
all of the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. We measure the effect of the 
market according to the return on the S&P 500 from the previous quarter. The Total 
Assets are reported in millions of US dollars and are equal to the book value of total 
assets. Growth Opportunities 2 is calculated as the percent change in assets over the 
quarter. Earned Equity is calculated as ratio of retained earnings to the book value of 
equity. Profitability 2 is calculated as the ratio of after-tax earnings to the book value of 
equity. 
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Each variable is added to the model one by one. Panels 1 through 5 of Table 9 
display the results of the forward selection process. Of the five variables in Model 6, only 
three of them are determined to be significant using forward selection: Status, S&P 500 
Return in the previous quarter, and Total Assets. Although this model excludes factors 
such Profitability and Growth Opportunities, it does imply that the dividend paying 
history of a firm as well as its size and opportunities for growth are likely to determine 
whether or not the firm will make a dividend payment in the following quarter. Panel 2 
indicates that these factors are statistically significant at the 0.01% level. 
Panel 3 displays the parameter estimates for Model 6, and Panel 4 displays the 
odds ratios. According to the estimates and the odds ratios, a non-dividend payer is 
267.82% more likely than a switcher firm to omit a cash dividend in the next quarter. 
Conversely, a dividend payer is 0.135% less likely than a switcher firm to omit or 
suspend dividends in the next quarter.  
A one unit increase in the S&P 500 index return is associated with a 3.121% 
increase in the likelihood that a firm will not pay a dividend. This is a bit surprising as we 
would expect that good economic conditions would foster the likelihood of dividend 
payments. It may be that the S&P500 quarterly return is not a complete measure of 
market conditions. Another explanation relates to findings in Tables 4 and 7. It may be 
that firms that cannot maintain regular dividend payment choose to omit or suspend them 
during good economic conditions, so as to mitigate the negative effects surrounding a 
dividend omission or suspension. 
We also employ step wise selection to determine which variables serve as the best 
predictor variables. Table 10 displays the results of the stepwise analysis. According to  
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Table 10 
 
Stepwise Selection Procedure With NBER Market Measure 
 
The probability modeled is that Payment = ‘No’. There were 309,742 instances between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2010 in which 
firms did not pay a dividend. There were 111,420 instances between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2010 in which firms paid a dividend. 
Using a binary logit model and Fisher’s scoring optimizing technique, variables are selected using stepwise selection process. The Status effect is 
represented by the two binary variables: Nonpayer and Payer. The binary variable “Nonpayer” is equal to 1 if the firm has not paid a regular cash dividend 
(distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if 
the firm has paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in all of the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. 
We measure the effect of the market according to the expansion and contractions defined by the NBER. The Economic Cycle effect is introduced as a binary 
variable called Expansion that is equal to 1 if the market is in an expansionary quarter and 0 when the market is in a contraction or recession period. The 
Total Assets are reported in millions of US dollars and are equal to the book value of total assets. Growth Opportunities 1 is calculated as the ratio of the 
market value of total capital to the book value of total assets ((book value of total assets-book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total 
assets). Growth Opportunities 2 is calculated as the percent change in assets over the quarter. Earned Equity is calculated as ratio of retained earnings to the 
book value of equity. Profitability 1 is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest to the book value of total assets. Profitability 2 is calculated as the 
ratio of after-tax earnings to the book value of equity.  
Panel 1: Fit Statistics 
Step -2 Log L AIC SC 
0 486,576 486,578 486,589 
1 117,599.86 117,605.86 117,638.71 
2 117,354.46 117,362.46 117,406.26 
3 117,070.09 117,082.09 117,147.79 
4 117,028.98 117,042.98 117,119.64 
5 116,915.77 116,931.77 117,019.37 
6 116,874.57 116,892.57 116,991.13 
7 116,668.04 116,688.04 116,797.54 
8 116,874.57 116,892.57 116,991.13 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
Stepwise Selection Procedure With NBER Market Measure 
 
Panel 2: Type 3 Analysis of Effects with Effect Coding 
Effect 
D
F Wald ChiSq Prob ChiSq 
Status 2 24,460.95 <.0001 
Economic Cycle 1 213.62 <.0001 
Status*Economic Cycle 2 215.13 <.0001 
Total Assets 1 36.75 <.0001 
Growth Opportunities 1 1 126.60 <.0001 
Profitability 1 1 116.80 <.0001 
Panel 3: Type 3 Parameter Estimates with Effect Coding 
Variable ClassVal0 ClassVal1 DF Estimate StdErr Wald ChiSq 
Prob 
ChiSq ExpEst 
Intercept 1 0.0794*** 0.0188 17.85 <.0001 1.083 
Status Nonpayer 1 4.7416*** 0.0309 23,576.40 <.0001 114.621 
Status Payer 1 -3.4543*** 0.0255 18,325.13 <.0001 0.032 
Economic Cycle Expansion 1 -0.2679*** 0.0183 213.62 <.0001 0.765 
Status*Economic Cycle Nonpayer Expansion 1 -0.4401*** 0.0308 203.77 <.0001 0.644 
Status*Economic Cycle Payer Expansion 1 0.3312*** 0.0255 168.62 <.0001 1.393 
Total Assets 1 -1.46E-06*** 2.42E-07 36.75 <.0001 1 
Growth Opportunities 1 1 0.039*** 0.00347 126.60 <.0001 1.04 
Profitability 1     1 -0.0894*** 0.00828 116.80 <.0001 0.914 
Panel 4: Type 3 Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect OddsRatioEst LowerCL UpperCL 
Total Assets 1 1 1 
Growth Opportunities 1 1.04 1.033 1.047 
Profitability 1 0.914 0.9 0.929 
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Panel 2, the variables that serve as the best predictors are dividend paying status, 
economic cycle, the interaction term between Status and Economic Cycle, Total Assets, 
Growth Opportunities 1, and Profitability 1. Parameter estimates and odds ratios are 
shown in Panels 3 and 4. Non-dividend payers are 114% more likely than switchers to 
not pay a dividend in the next quarter, while regular dividend payers are 0.03% less likely 
to pay a dividend than switcher firms. During an economic expansion, firms are 0.765% 
less likely to omit or suspend dividend payments than they are in a recession. During an 
expansion, non-dividend paying firms are 0.644% less likely, than a switcher, to not pay 
a dividend. Corroborating preliminary findings in Table 3, dividend payers are 1.393% 
more likely than switcher firms to discontinue or omit dividends during an expansion. As 
in the previous models, a one unit increase in Total Assets is associated with a 1% 
decrease in the likelihood that a firm will not pay a dividend. A one unit increase in 
Growth Opportunities 1 increases the likelihood that a firm will not pay a dividend. On 
the other hand, a one unit increase in profitability decreases the likelihood that a firm will 
not pay a dividend by 0.914%. 
2.6. Summary and Conclusions 
Previous studies that concern dividend payments relate dividend payments to 
earnings, size, and growth opportunities. More recent literature finds that the relation 
between dividends and earnings is deteriorating. Managers have admitted their reluctance 
to deviate from their dividend paying history. Those firms that pay dividends continue to 
do so because these firms have historically paid dividends regularly and managers feel 
obligated to continue those cash distributions. Repurchases have become the new way to 
distribute earnings. 
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This begs the question as to whether a firm’s dividend paying history can be used 
to determine the likelihood of future dividend payments.  
The recent financial crisis brought on announcements of dividend reductions and 
suspensions, so we also investigate the possibility that the state of the economy affects a 
firm’s likelihood of distributing dividends. 
This study has found that firms perceived as dividend payers are likely to 
continue to pay dividends, while firms that do not have a history of paying cash dividends 
are not likely to begin dividend payments. In times of expansion, switcher firms are more 
likely to pay dividends than when a recession is occurring. Non-dividend payers are more 
likely to initiate dividends in an expansion than in a recession. Surprisingly, all models 
found that dividend payers are more likely to omit a dividend during an expansionary 
period. Although this seems surprising at first glance, managers are reluctant to change 
dividend policy, and pay dividends out of a feeling of obligation. If firms are not able to 
sustain dividend payments in the long run, it seems a better strategy for the manager to 
announce dividend omissions or suspensions during relatively healthy economic 
circumstances. This new and counterintuitive finding has not been documented in 
previous literature and is an important contribution of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 3: DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND INCREASES OR DECREASES OF 
U.S. STOCKS AND THE EFFECTS ON RETURNS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Examination of typical dividend paying firm will reveal that dividends are paid 
quarterly and the amount of cash dividend per share does not fluctuate, in fact it usually 
remains at the same level for very long periods of time. In most cases, a dividend paying 
firm has a very long history of paying dividends. Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely 
(2005) find that most regular, dividend-paying firms continue to pay dividends because 
they feel obligated to do so due to their long history of paying dividends. In fact, they no 
longer adhere to target dividend payout ratios, instead they rely on past dividend levels 
when determining the firm’s distribution policy. 
Many studies have found a decreasing number of dividend paying firms (Skinner 
(2008); DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004); Fama and French (2001)). Instead of 
cash dividends, more and more firms are using stock repurchases.  
However, if regular-dividend paying firms are relying on past dividend levels in 
determining the firm’s distribution policy, then a change in the dividend level of these 
firms should imply important information about the firm itself. This is especially true 
when investors are uncertain about future market conditions. The recent market downturn 
also increased uncertainty, implying that any dividend changes indicate fundamental 
changes of important consequences for the firm’s future. 
During the recent financial crisis, in addition to the free fall in stock prices, the 
financial news was filled with reports of decreasing dividends. In some cases, companies 
even suspended dividends. Prior literature has established that dividends convey 
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information about future firm prospects (see, for instance, Lee (1996)). Thus, there 
seemed to be more bad news for stock prices in the downturn spirals.  
The grim dividend news may have been pushing stock prices down further. Lee 
(1995) found that stock prices respond strongly to temporary shocks to dividends. 
Investors cannot distinguish the temporary shock components from the permanent ones, 
so they tend to consider temporary components as permanent components, creating a 
strong reaction to temporary dividend shocks.  
Previous literature has also pointed to fundamental changes in firms. The number 
of firms paying dividends has declined dramatically since the 1970s (DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, & Skinner, 2000; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 2004; Hayn, 1995; 
Graham, Koski, & Loewenstein, 2006). Instead, firms that are distributing earnings are 
using stock repurchases that became popular in the 1980s (Skinner, 2008). The current 
financial crisis is sure to bring about further changes in the fundamentals, which should 
be reflected in the dividend distributions, but the relatively small number of regular 
dividend payers makes Litner’s (1956) findings more important. He notes that managers 
are reluctant to change regular cash dividends because a dividend decrease in the future 
will have negative effects for the firm. Therefore, any change in the firm’s dividend level 
is of great consequence, and should reveal significant information. 
More recently, Fuller and Blau (2010) find evidence of signaling in dividend 
paying firms. They find the firms perceived as high quality firms due to their previous 
earnings pay dividends to eliminate the free cash flow problem, while firms that are 
perceived as low quality because of low earning in previous periods pay small dividends. 
However, firms that are perceived as intermediate quality firms, pay higher dividends 
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than firms perceived as high quality firms. The evidence suggests that healthy firms with 
intermediate earnings are attempting to distinguish themselves from poor quality firms. 
In this chapter, we will divide firms into dividend paying, non-dividend paying, 
and switchers. We will investigate the relation between dividends and stock prices in 
each group and among the groups. The questions that will be answered in this study are 
as follows: What is the reaction of firms around the world to the current crisis? Have 
firms become fundamentally different as a result of the crisis? Are firms reducing their 
dividends because of current losses and persistent earnings problems? If so, are dividend 
reductions decreasing their stock prices? Have the investors been giving preference to 
holding dividend paying stocks in anticipation that during the downturn such stocks may 
hold up better in terms of their prices? 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a brief 
review of literature. Section 3.3 contains a brief description of the data.  Section 3.4 
presents the methodology. Section 3.5 discusses the results. The last section summarizes 
the findings and concludes. 
3.2. Review of Literature 
Lee (1996) decomposes dividends into temporary and permanent components and 
finds that dividends are only affected by the permanent component of earnings. He 
asserts that changes in dividends anticipate changes in permanent earnings, so dividends 
convey information about future firm prospects.   In addition, investors react strongly to 
temporary dividend shocks because they cannot distinguish between temporary and 
permanent components. This position is supported by previous literature, which finds that 
persistent earnings problems cause reductions in dividends. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
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Skinner (1992) found that 50.9% of NYSE firms with reported losses during 1980-1985 
reduced dividends. 
The composition of dividends themselves is also changing. Skinner (2008) points 
out the substitution effect between dividends and repurchases that began emerging in the 
1980s for the U.S. firms. Using Lintner model regressions, Skinner (2008) finds the 
relation between repurchases and earnings becomes stronger over time, while the relation 
between dividends and earnings weakens over time.  
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004) find that although aggregate dividends 
distributed by firms are increasing, the number of firms that are paying out dividends is 
actually decreasing. This implies that dividends are concentrated to a few firms. They 
find that about half of dividends reported in Compustat for the year 2000 were paid out 
by top 25 earning firms.  In their earlier paper (2000), they show that special dividends 
have been disappearing since the 1960s.  DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006), Fama 
and French (2001), and Skinner (2008) also observe similar declines in dividend paying 
firms. Related to this position, Hayn (1995) finds that the earnings of firms have changed 
in recent times. The frequency and magnitude of losses has increased so that earnings are 
more volatile. Firms are fundamentally different, and a difference in fundamentals 
manifests itself as a difference in firm distributions. 
Graham, Koski, and Loewenstein (2006) examine liquidity, volume, price 
volatility, adverse selection, and price impact for very anticipated, anticipated, and 
unanticipated events, particularly dividend announcements. They look at two samples of 
firms: Firms that announce they will begin paying dividends, and firms that regularly 
(predictably) make quarterly dividend announcements. Examining the period between 
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1990 and 1998 and using CRSP data, LexisNexis announcements, Dow Jones News 
Retrieval, and the Wall Street Journal Index, they find that for very predictable events, 
liquidity and volume increase before the event, and liquidity returns to normal levels after 
the event. After the event, they do not find evidence of asymmetric information. For 
anticipated events, there is some evidence that the spread remains wider after the 
announcement, which implies asymmetric information. For unanticipated events, the 
evidence of asymmetric information prior to the event is more evident. The data shows a 
decline in adverse information and price volatility after the event. The spread widens, 
depth shrinks, and volume is high, implying that information is being priced and 
portfolios are being rebalanced. Contrary to previous literature, they do not find 
information asymmetry effects in stocks predominantly held by institutional investors.  
Graham, Koski, and Loewenstein (2006) point out that the increased activity after 
a dividend initiation announcement implies that the firm is fundamentally different. This 
may be what leads to the increase in trading, which reflects portfolio rebalancing and 
possibly purchases by institutional investors. A reverse process may be observed in the 
market downturn spiral in the Fall of 2008, which was a surprise to most. Many firms 
were fundamentally changed by the financial crisis. Many firms announced dividend 
suspensions or decreases. By extension, the surprise declining dividend announcements 
may be followed by large institutional investor sell- offs.  
Graham, Koski, and Loewenstein (2006) also find that high content information, 
even if the event was anticipated, leads to high volume and spreads and a decrease in 
liquidity after the event occurs. Although the market downturn was a surprise, there was a 
lot of information revealed regarding firms and the market. Volatility was, and still is, at 
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historically high levels, volume and spreads are high, and liquidity is low. At this time, 
announcements that dividends are being suspended or decreased are very high content 
information, and signal that the firm is fundamentally different. 
Few studies have examined dividend changes and their effects on returns. Li and 
Lie (2006) expand the catering theory hypothesis of Baker and Wurgler (2004) to explain 
changes in dividends. They find that managers are influenced by investor demands for 
dividends. When the dividend premium is high, dividend initiations increase, while a low 
dividend premium is associated with dividend omissions. They do find some evidence 
that dividend increases are related to high dividend premiums, while dividend decreases 
are related to low dividend premiums, but the evidence is statistically weak. Another 
problem with the study is that the measure of dividend premium (measured as the log 
difference between the value weighted market to book value on dividend paying firms 
and non-dividend paying firms) is measured at the beginning of the year, while dividends 
are paid quarterly. The study does cover a large time span (1963 – 2000) and includes 
controls for firm specific factors such as dividend yield, size, and various fundamental 
ratios, but it does not control for structural breaks, nor does it take into account the state 
of the economy. The literature has shown fundamental changes in firms, as well as in 
their dividend policies and returns, during the 1960s and the 1980s, and the state of the 
economy has fluctuated dramatically during the sample period. These factors may be 
important determinants of dividend policy changes, and may explain the irregular 
dividend increase pattern observed in Li and Lie (2006) after the 1980s. 
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) find evidence against the signaling theory 
using dividend changes. They find instead that dividend changes simply signal 
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information about what has happened, namely increases in permanent earnings. What is 
surprising is that they observe negative future earnings in firms that have increased 
dividends. The positive relation between dividend changes and future earnings is 
insignificant despite a large number of control variables. Other studies also fail to find a 
relation between dividend changes and future earnings (Watts, 1973; Gonedes, 1978, 
Penman, 1983, and others). 
Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) use return on assets as a measure of 
profitability to examine firm characteristics related to dividend changes. Their results also 
strongly conflict with the signaling theory, but support the life cycle hypothesis. Like 
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) and others, they fail to find a relation between 
dividend changes and future earnings. In fact, they find that dividend increasing 
(decreasing) firms exhibit higher (lower) profitability prior to the dividend increase 
(decrease), but profitability declines (recovers) in the years following the announcement. 
This study is the first we know of to relate the dividend increase (decrease) to the firm’s 
decrease (increase) in cost of capital. They use the Fama and French three-factor model 
to characterize dividend increasing firms from decreasing firms before and after dividend 
changes. Their study period is also quite long, and structural breaks or market cycles are 
not controlled for. Although they attempt to control for profitability, given the recent 
study by Fuller and Blau (2010), it would seem that a more appropriate control for 
profitability would involve creating groups of high profit, intermediate profit, and low 
profit firms.  
The findings against the signaling theory in Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler 
(1997) and Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) seem very strong, but they may 
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be related to the fact that in measuring profitability, they adjusted for drift, but did not 
address measurement error associated with their adjustment for drift on profitability, nor 
did they address the omitted correlated variables that should control for expected changes 
in future earnings (Nissim and Ziv, 2001). Contrary to their findings, Brickley (1983), 
Aharony and Dotan (1994), Nissim and Ziv (2001), as well as others find that dividend 
changes are related to future earnings. They find that increases in earnings continue in to 
the following year. 
Koch and Sun (2004) also examine dividend changes, but relate them to earnings. 
Their results imply that reactions to dividend changes may be delayed reactions to recent 
earnings announcements. They find that dividends convey information to investors. They 
relate information regarding the persistence of past earnings. If management expects 
earnings increases to continue, an increase in dividends may signal this information to the 
market, and investors will revise their expectations creating positive abnormal returns. 
On the other hand, if dividend changes contradict previous earnings, the market will 
experience a reversal. These findings are of interest because most recent dividend 
literature discounts the relation between earnings and dividends. It seems that although 
the relation between earnings and repurchases has become stronger (Skinner, 2008), 
repurchases may convey short-term information about the firm, while cash dividend 
changes convey fundamental changes in the firm itself. 
3.3. Data 
The data for this study comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and Compustat database. Quarterly returns data for all securities in the CRSP 
database are gathered for the 1990-2009 calendar years. In order to classify firms as 
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dividend payers, non-dividend payers, or “switchers,” data is gathered on annual 
dividends for the period 1990 – 2009 from CRSP.  
As in Chapter 1, firms are identified as dividend payers, non-dividend payers, and 
“switcher” firms based on their dividend paying history in the previous twelve quarters. 
Firms identified as dividend payers have paid a regular, quarterly, cash dividend in all of 
the previous twelve quarters. We identify these distributions using the CRSP database 
code “1232.” Firms that have not paid a single regular, quarterly, cash dividend in the 
previous twelve quarters are labeled as non-dividend payers. Switcher firms are those that 
paid regular, quarterly, cash dividends within the previous twelve quarters, but did not 
distribute dividends in every quarter. 
Data on firm fundamentals and information from financial statements are obtained 
from the Compustat database. This data is used to sort returns into portfolios and develop 
the quarterly factors SMB and HML from the Fama and French three-factor model, as 
described in the methodology section. 
 In order to determine whether dividends mattered during the 2008 market 
downturn, we have to examine whether the three types of firms (dividend paying, non-
dividend paying, and switchers) are different based on their returns.  This has important 
implications for investors.  In particular, we would like to investigate which one of the 
three groups of firm stocks may hold up better in terms of their prices during a downturn 
spiral. In order to proxy the state of the economy we use NBER classifications of 
recessions and expansions. 
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3.4. Methodology 
One of the main contributions of this study is to determine if the state of the 
economy matters in determining dividend distribution changes. Such investigation has 
been rare since downturn spirals have been historically few in the US financial markets. 
Table 11 shows how rare dividend changes are. Of the 117,722 dividends paid 
throughout our sample period, only 4,757 of them were lower than the previous dividend. 
During this same time period, there were 19,917 instances were dividend levels were 
increased, but in almost 80% of cases, dividend levels did not change from the previous 
quarter. There were a number of firms that were classified as nonpayers, but began 
paying dividends. They are included in this table as “nonpayers.” It is notable that these 
nonpayer firms that initiated dividends have a higher likelihood of decreasing dividends, 
while switcher firms have a higher likelihood of increasing dividends. 
Table 12 shows how dividend levels have changes over the course of our study 
period. Not much can be said of the number of decreases or increases of non-dividend 
payers during economic recessions, as there were very few in each quarter. On the other 
hand, dividend payers saw a decline in dividend level decreases and increases during the 
recession of 2001. This is consistent with the idea that managers are reluctant to change  
Table 11 
 
Number of Dividend Changes (1993Q1 – 2009Q2) 
 
Firms are identified as non-dividend payers if they have not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code 
“1232” in the CRSP database) within the last 12 quarters. Firms are identified as dividend payers if they 
paid a regular cash dividend in the previous 12 quarters. If a firm has paid dividends irregularly within the 
most recent 12 quarters, it is identified as a “Switcher” firm. 
 
Status Decrease Increase   No Change 
Nonpayer 210 6.56% 556 17.36% 2,437 76.08% 
Payer 2,754 3.88% 11,322 15.93% 56,982 80.19% 
Switcher 1,793 4.13% 8,039 18.50% 33,629 77.38% 
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dividend payment policies. However, the recession in late 2007 paints a different picture. 
Dividend decreases increase dramatically as the recession gets deeper. The number of 
decreases almost doubles between the fall and winter of 2008. Dividend increases also 
show signs of a recession. They experience a serious drop off as the recession deepens. 
The pattern for switcher firms is similar to that of regular dividend paying firms. 
We employ a logistic regression analysis in order to identify the determinants of 
dividend changes. We model the probability that the dividend will increase, decrease, or 
not change. The factors recognized by previous literature include earnings, profitability, 
and size. We include these in our model. We also include a binary variable to control for 
economic conditions, as well as the firms’ dividend paying status. 
Previous literature on dividend paying firm characteristics has established that 
dividend paying firms tend to be of large size. Market value and book equity are also  
found to be related to the propensity to pay dividends. That being the case, we felt it 
appropriate to use the Fama-French three-factor model in examining excess returns 
across dividend paying groups. We also use the Fama-French three-factor model in 
examining excess returns before and during the downturn to see if changes have occurred 
in the relations between excess return and the market, size, and book-to-market factors: 
 ݎ௜ ൌ ܽ௜ ൅ ܾ௜ሺܴ௠ െ ௙ܴሻ ൅ ݏ௜ܵܯܤ ൅ ݄௜ܪܯܮ ൅ ݁௜ (7) 
Where ri is the return on portfolio i, Rf is the T-bill rate, and Rm is the market return 
proxied by the return on the CRSP value-weighted index. Six size-BM portfolios are 
formed in June of each year to create the SMB and HML factors. The SMB factor is 
calculated as the difference between the average return on the three small size portfolios 
and the three big size portfolios. The HML factor is calculated as the difference between 
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Table 12 
 
Number of Dividend Changes Over Time (1993Q1 – 2009Q2) 
 
Firms are identified as non-dividend payers if they have not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code 
“1232” in the CRSP database) within the last 12 quarters. Firms are identified as dividend payers if they 
paid a regular cash dividend in the previous 12 quarters. If a firm has paid dividends irregularly within the 
most recent 12 quarters, it is identified as a “Switcher” firm. 
 
 
 
  
Panel 1: Dividend Changes for Non-Dividend Payers 
Year & 
Quarter 
Decrease Increase No 
Change 
Year & 
Quarter 
Decrease Increase No 
Change 
1993Q1 1 4 15 2001Q2 1 3 5 
1993Q2   3 15 2001Q3 1 1 7 
1993Q3       2001Q4 29 85 529 
1993Q4 6 6 6 2002Q1   3 7 
1994Q1 2 10 22 2002Q2     5 
1994Q2 5 5 36 2002Q3 30 135 726 
1994Q3 32 120 580 2002Q4 1   10 
1994Q4 2 4 21 2003Q1 2 5 6 
1995Q1 8 2 18 2003Q2 2 2 7 
1995Q2 3 7 18 2003Q3 5 8 13 
1995Q3 4 1 6 2003Q4 1 3 24 
1995Q4 5 5 13 2004Q1 1 5 17 
1996Q1 6 8 5 2004Q2 5 5 14 
1996Q2 2 7 15 2004Q3 1 3 11 
1996Q3 1   13 2004Q4 1 6 12 
1996Q4 4 3 11 2005Q1 2 10 14 
1997Q1 4 1 7 2005Q2 3 10 24 
1997Q2 2 2 13 2005Q3 2 2 7 
1997Q3 2 3 5 2005Q4 1 8 5 
1997Q4 1 4 10 2006Q1   4 10 
1998Q1 2 6 5 2006Q2   3 11 
1998Q2 4 2 11 2006Q3 2 2 7 
1998Q3 1 2 6 2006Q4   3 3 
1998Q4 1 2 12 2007Q1 2 5 2 
1999Q1   1 10 2007Q2 1 2 12 
1999Q2 1 3 16 2007Q3 3 2 7 
1999Q3 1 1 7 2007Q4 4 4 8 
1999Q4   4 4 2008Q1 3 6 7 
2000Q1 1 3 2 2008Q2 1 1 6 
2000Q2 1 1 1 2008Q3   3 3 
2000Q3   2 3 2008Q4 1 1   
2000Q4 1 1 1 2009Q1 1   3 
2001Q1     2 2009Q2 2   1 
 
 
65 
 
Table 12 (continued) 
 
Panel 2: Dividend Changes for Dividend Payers 
Year & 
Quarter 
Decrease Increase No 
Change 
 Year & 
Quarter 
Decrease Increase No 
Change 
1993Q1 35 143 596  2001Q2 10 49 484 
1993Q2 45 156 941 2001Q3 13 55 513 
1993Q3 47 140 899 2001Q4       
1993Q4 63 201 1000  2002Q1 24 122 513 
1994Q1 61 225 988  2002Q2 22 81 579 
1994Q2 46 180 1059  2002Q3 22 74 576 
1994Q3 31 178 1048  2002Q4 16 115 570 
1994Q4 33 209 1016  2003Q1 12 162 554 
1995Q1 34 250 1030  2003Q2 22 99 681 
1995Q2 42 213 1119  2003Q3 18 150 633 
1995Q3 33 179 1157  2003Q4 30 171 755 
1995Q4 52 222 1065  2004Q1 41 228 746 
1996Q1 55 256 1061  2004Q2 43 170 933 
1996Q2 57 220 1140  2004Q3 35 193 994 
1996Q3 49 174 1184  2004Q4 38 217 984 
1996Q4 36 255 1106  2005Q1 38 299 939 
1997Q1 51 297 1080  2005Q2 56 205 981 
1997Q2 74 188 1144  2005Q3 35 179 1018 
1997Q3 73 196 1072  2005Q4 28 231 958 
1997Q4 84 213 924  2006Q1 25 311 908 
1998Q1 62 198 767  2006Q2 45 236 999 
1998Q2 72 107 662  2006Q3 50 188 1018 
1998Q3 56 112 676  2006Q4 23 239 1029 
1998Q4 30 108 595  2007Q1 28 315 941 
1999Q1 23 150 564  2007Q2 29 230 1055 
1999Q2 25 95 590  2007Q3 21 200 1051 
1999Q3 33 93 568  2007Q4 26 221 1037 
1999Q4 17 85 536  2008Q1 45 269 962 
2000Q1 11 126 491  2008Q2 50 194 1084 
2000Q2 16 72 502  2008Q3 55 160 1050 
2000Q3 7 48 443  2008Q4 91 130 998 
2000Q4 13 55 359  2009Q1 156 116 903 
2001Q1 13 86 397  2009Q2 135 87 935 
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Table 12 (continued) 
 
Panel 3: Dividend Changes for Switchers 
Year & 
Quarter 
Decrease Increase No 
Change 
Year & 
Quarter 
Decrease Increase No 
Change 
1993Q1 44 99 533 2001Q2 40 185 827 
1993Q2 23 42 346 2001Q3 33 122 843 
1993Q3 23 59 409 2001Q4 37 147 752 
1993Q4 27 106 434 2002Q1 31 180 705 
1994Q1 27 142 399 2002Q2 40 140 751 
1994Q2   107 541 2002Q3       
1994Q3 20     2002Q4 24 155 682 
1994Q4 27 141 523 2003Q1 30 175 632 
1995Q1 33 177 530 2003Q2 17 148 627 
1995Q2 24 107 577 2003Q3 28 156 598 
1995Q3 19 138 555 2003Q4 30 120 505 
1995Q4 21 131 548 2004Q1 22 135 454 
1996Q1 18 162 433 2004Q2 15 93 425 
1996Q2 30 111 504 2004Q3 13 103 340 
1996Q3 26 101 508 2004Q4 15 86 314 
1996Q4 17 129 498 2005Q1 16 136 321 
1997Q1 18 131 433 2005Q2 19 102 360 
1997Q2 29 82 447 2005Q3 22 104 395 
1997Q3 16 93 450 2005Q4 23 109 409 
1997Q4 48 83 370 2006Q1 15 135 366 
1998Q1 49 143 399 2006Q2 20 105 392 
1998Q2 84 139 542 2006Q3 17 81 406 
1998Q3 73 143 741 2006Q4 10 111 366 
1998Q4 51 223 810 2007Q1 15 127 285 
1999Q1 41 208 823 2007Q2 14 101 310 
1999Q2 45 173 885 2007Q3 6 86 343 
1999Q3 24 116 908 2007Q4 13 89 324 
1999Q4 20 171 764 2008Q1 7 92 285 
2000Q1 32 226 778 2008Q2 19 79 265 
2000Q2 41 162 882 2008Q3 19 69 277 
2000Q3 22 128 852 2008Q4 30 48 237 
2000Q4 46 202 797 2009Q1 39 34 204 
2001Q1 37 208 758 2009Q2 27 25 223 
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the average returns on the two high book-to-market portfolios and the two low book-to-
market portfolios. These factors are available on Kenneth French’s website in monthly, 
weekly, and daily frequencies. However, we construct the factors on a quarterly basis to 
examine quarterly returns. 
Finally, we examine the daily returns and excess returns surrounding dividend 
declarations to detect the effect of dividend changes on returns. Examining quarterly 
returns is informative, but examining returns surrounding the day of announcement will 
help us isolate the effect on returns from the dividend change. In order to do this, we 
calculate the cumulative stock return during days -1, 0, and +1, where day 0 is the 
dividend declaration date. We also calculate the return in excess of the risk free rate, and 
compare across the types of firms and economic cycles. 
3.5. Empirical Results 
To reiterate our purpose briefly, we are identifying determinants of dividend level 
changes, and then comparing the returns on dividend paying, non-dividend paying, and 
switcher firms during the market downturn, which took a major dive in the late summer 
of 2008, and became very volatile in the months that followed.  
Table 13 displays summary statistics on dividend levels, dividend changes, and 
dividend percent changes for non-dividend payers, regular dividend payers, and switcher 
firms. Dividend payers tend to payout higher dividends, while non-dividend payers that 
recently began paying dividends tend to have the highest level of dividend changes, as 
well as percentage changes.  
Table 14 displays the average dividend levels, level changes, and percentage 
changes throughout our study period. It does not show evidence of major average 
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dividend changes or percentage changes during the recession of 2001. On the other hand, 
the recent recession is marked by average decreases in dividend levels and negative 
percentage changes, on average, no matter the dividend paying status of the firm. It is 
also evident that non-dividend paying firms, that recently began paying dividends, seem 
to experience the most volatility in their dividend payment levels during recessionary 
periods. 
Table 15 provides summary statistics for various determinants of dividend 
payment identified by previous literature. Summary statistics are divided according to 
dividend paying status and based on whether the firm increased, decreased, or did not 
change the dividend payment. On average, dividend payers have higher total assets, 
market value, profitability, and earned equity. Dividend payers that decrease dividends 
have lower market value, but their growth opportunities tend to be much higher. In fact, 
firms that decrease dividend payments have higher growth opportunities regardless of 
their dividend paying status. 
Table 16 also presents summary statistics of various dividend determinants, but they are 
sorted according to the economic conditions present when the dividend announcement 
took place. It is notable, that dividend paying firms have the highest total assets and 
market value, and firms that decrease dividends during a recession have, by far, the 
highest total assets. On the other hand, the firms that increase dividends during a 
recession have the highest average market value, even higher than the average market 
value during an expansion. This implies that increasing dividends during a recession is 
accepted as a positive signal by the market. 
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Table 13 
 
Summary Statistics of Dividend Payment Level, Change, and Percentage Change 
 
Firms are identified as non-dividend payers if they have not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code 
“1232” in the CRSP database) within the last 12 quarters. Firms are identified as dividend payers if they 
paid a regular cash dividend in the previous 12 quarters. If a firm has paid dividends irregularly within the 
most recent 12 quarters, it is identified as a “Switcher” firm. 
 
Panel 1: Dividend Payment 
Status Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Nonpayer 0.15 0.10 0.000 2.00 
Dividend Payer 0.21 0.16 0.003 5.98 
Switcher 0.17 0.11 0.002 4.45 
Panel 2: Dividend Change 
Status Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Nonpayer 0.003 0 -1.00 1.60 
Dividend Payer 0.000 0 -5.30 5.30 
Switcher 0.001 0 -2.73 5.30 
Panel 3: Dividend Percent Change 
Status Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Nonpayer 10.22% 10.22% -99.98% 2100% 
Dividend Payer 1.01% 1.01% -98.40% 6566% 
Switcher 3.25% 3.25% -98.02% 6356% 
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Table 14 
 
Average Dividend Payment Level, Change, and Percentage Change 
 
Firms are identified as non-dividend payers if they have not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code 
“1232” in the CRSP database) within the last 12 quarters. Firms are identified as dividend payers if they 
paid a regular cash dividend in the previous 12 quarters. If a firm has paid dividends irregularly within the 
most recent 12 quarters, it is identified as a “Switcher” firm. 
 
Year & 
Quarter 
  NonPayer   Payer   Switcher 
Payment Change 
Percent 
Change Payment Change 
Percent 
Change Payment Change 
Percent 
Change 
1993Q1 0.104 0.019 14.85% 0.239 -0.001 0.44% 0.175 -0.007 0.05% 
1993Q2 0.068 0.030 17.20% 0.229 -0.002 0.38% 0.123 -0.001 1.30% 
1993Q3     0.232 -0.002 -0.11% 0.118 0.000 1.47% 
1993Q4 0.136 0.025 64.66% 0.222 -0.001 0.35% 0.123 0.003 3.82% 
1994Q1 0.146 0.014 11.32% 0.222 0.000 1.38% 0.128 0.007 10.01% 
1994Q2 0.139 -0.001 3.81% 0.220 -0.001 0.66% 0.133 0.002 3.11% 
1994Q3 0.138 0.002 3.54% 0.221 0.002 2.29% 0.143 0.003 5.59% 
1994Q4 0.199 0.006 7.40% 0.221 0.001 1.29% 0.150 0.004 5.22% 
1995Q1 0.124 -0.017 -11.90% 0.221 0.002 1.68% 0.145 0.001 2.51% 
1995Q2 0.103 0.005 16.06% 0.220 0.001 1.22% 0.151 0.004 4.48% 
1995Q3 0.125 -0.008 -5.12% 0.219 0.002 1.51% 0.159 0.003 5.46% 
1995Q4 0.119 0.006 81.70% 0.218 -0.001 1.22% 0.155 0.002 4.60% 
1996Q1 0.106 -0.010 6.59% 0.218 0.001 0.80% 0.156 0.000 2.05% 
1996Q2 0.128 0.004 5.54% 0.216 -0.002 0.81% 0.156 0.000 2.45% 
1996Q3 0.109 -0.003 -4.76% 0.214 -0.001 0.42% 0.161 0.003 3.57% 
1996Q4 0.098 -0.016 -10.13% 0.215 0.002 1.55% 0.152 0.004 4.84% 
1997Q1 0.135 -0.076 -18.41% 0.218 0.002 2.34% 0.146 -0.002 1.24% 
1997Q2 0.143 0.001 0.43% 0.217 -0.004 0.41% 0.148 0.002 3.43% 
1997Q3 0.119 0.029 26.28% 0.212 -0.003 0.00% 0.147 0.008 5.86% 
1997Q4 0.160 0.041 23.82% 0.213 -0.002 -0.58% 0.153 -0.001 1.64% 
1998Q1 0.136 0.046 144.62% 0.212 -0.001 -0.21% 0.163 -0.006 -1.02% 
1998Q2 0.134 -0.013 -9.34% 0.203 -0.006 -1.91% 0.163 -0.003 -0.21% 
1998Q3 0.138 0.005 -0.26% 0.191 -0.004 -1.23% 0.168 0.000 1.63% 
1998Q4 0.140 -0.009 8.50% 0.190 -0.001 0.06% 0.169 0.000 1.28% 
1999Q1 0.122 0.013 18.18% 0.195 0.001 0.91% 0.172 0.000 0.75% 
1999Q2 0.100 0.000 4.94% 0.188 0.000 0.95% 0.175 0.000 0.83% 
1999Q3 0.065 -0.001 -0.37% 0.188 -0.002 -0.82% 0.175 0.002 3.61% 
1999Q4 0.191 0.009 6.79% 0.184 -0.001 0.69% 0.175 0.002 4.08% 
2000Q1 0.146 0.001 -1.33% 0.184 0.002 2.02% 0.175 -0.001 0.26% 
2000Q2 0.109 0.130 126.67% 0.185 0.000 0.29% 0.177 0.001 1.17% 
2000Q3 0.100 0.007 8.48% 0.182 0.001 0.49% 0.181 0.000 2.76% 
2000Q4   0.123 -0.010 -7.19%   0.182 0.002 0.81%   0.182 0.002 3.17% 
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Table 14 (continued) 
 
Year & 
Quarter 
  NonPayer   Payer   Switcher 
Payment Change 
Percent 
Change Payment Change 
Percent 
Change Payment Change 
Percent 
Change 
2001Q1 0.075 0.000 0.00% 0.179 0.001 1.03% 0.186 0.000 0.86% 
2001Q2 0.116 0.007 4.67% 0.184 0.001 0.63% 0.181 0.000 0.69% 
2001Q3 0.209 -0.039 4.45% 0.181 -0.001 0.38% 0.184 -0.001 0.95% 
2001Q4 0.187 -0.003 -0.94% 0.184 0.000 1.62% 0.177 0.000 1.31% 
2002Q1 0.137 0.012 42.50% 0.185 0.000 0.40% 0.181 0.001 0.39% 
2002Q2 0.120 0.000 0.00% 0.185 -0.001 -0.14% 0.185 0.002 2.47% 
2002Q3 0.178 0.000 2.74% 0.185 0.000 3.82% 0.185 0.001 1.95% 
2002Q4 0.087 -0.011 -7.27% 0.189 0.003 1.93% 0.184 0.006 5.87% 
2003Q1 0.106 -0.004 101.90% 0.191 0.000 0.78% 0.185 0.002 6.34% 
2003Q2 0.114 0.028 25.65% 0.195 0.003 3.17% 0.178 -0.001 2.65% 
2003Q3 0.105 -0.002 93.79% 0.204 0.006 4.44% 0.164 0.004 4.99% 
2003Q4 0.100 0.023 58.93% 0.205 -0.001 2.24% 0.157 0.001 2.99% 
2004Q1 0.085 0.023 161.52% 0.203 0.000 1.32% 0.153 0.010 10.02% 
2004Q2 0.110 -0.011 24.03% 0.202 0.000 1.63% 0.150 0.007 7.24% 
2004Q3 0.102 0.051 92.46% 0.205 0.002 2.08% 0.140 0.007 7.62% 
2004Q4 0.105 -0.004 14.76% 0.214 0.005 2.33% 0.149 0.002 5.56% 
2005Q1 0.140 0.030 29.85% 0.214 0.000 1.16% 0.154 0.003 5.10% 
2005Q2 0.165 0.066 50.72% 0.214 -0.001 0.96% 0.156 -0.002 3.47% 
2005Q3 0.097 -0.001 0.72% 0.214 0.004 1.87% 0.160 0.011 11.03% 
2005Q4 0.164 0.042 91.88% 0.223 0.006 3.16% 0.167 0.005 9.74% 
2006Q1 0.129 0.033 46.30% 0.222 0.001 1.24% 0.165 -0.001 2.02% 
2006Q2 0.116 0.018 24.22% 0.220 0.000 1.65% 0.167 0.008 6.05% 
2006Q3 0.078 -0.012 -7.27% 0.218 0.002 1.64% 0.172 0.006 4.97% 
2006Q4 0.177 0.058 26.34% 0.223 0.003 2.77% 0.182 0.013 10.05% 
2007Q1 0.137 -0.096 4.13% 0.224 0.001 1.89% 0.184 0.008 4.07% 
2007Q2 0.128 0.001 5.58% 0.225 0.004 4.63% 0.189 0.001 2.43% 
2007Q3 0.167 -0.011 -7.85% 0.227 0.005 2.42% 0.196 0.013 6.63% 
2007Q4 0.137 -0.007 6.08% 0.236 -0.002 2.71% 0.208 -0.001 23.28% 
2008Q1 0.138 0.051 123.91% 0.231 0.000 0.01% 0.205 0.000 1.10% 
2008Q2 0.102 -0.003 43.06% 0.232 0.000 0.88% 0.199 -0.015 -0.61% 
2008Q3 0.184 0.178 46.66% 0.232 -0.006 -1.85% 0.192 -0.011 -3.35% 
2008Q4 0.440 0.216 341.67% 0.221 -0.022 -7.15% 0.171 -0.012 -3.41% 
2009Q1 0.050 -0.127 -22.07% 0.208 -0.015 -5.46% 0.160 0.000 2.46% 
2009Q2   0.234 -0.071 -36.41%   0.204 -0.002 -1.03%   0.169 0.005 3.23% 
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In order to determine the factors affecting dividend changes, we employ a 
polytomous logistic regression. A polytomous logistic regression allows for a dependent 
variable that has more than two categorical responses. Therefore, our response row is 
 ݕ௜ ൌ ሺݕ௜ଵ, ݕ௜ଶ, … , ݕ௜௥ሻ் (8) 
We assume a multinomial distribution with index ݊௜ ൌ ∑ ݕ௜௝௥௝ୀଵ  and parameter 
ߨ௜ ൌ ሺߨ௜ଵ, ߨ௜ଶ, … , ߨ௜௥ሻ். We relate ߨ௜ to covariates through a set of r-1 baseline-category 
logits. Taking j* as the baseline category, the model is  
 ݈݋݃ ൬ గ೔ೕగ೔ೕ∗൰ ൌ ݔ௜் ߚ௝,							݆ ് ݆
∗. (9) 
If xi has length p, then the model has ሺݎ െ 1ሻ ൈ ݌ free parameters, which we can 
arrange as a matrix or a vector. The last category is the baseline ሺ݆∗ ൌ ݎሻ, so the 
coefficients are  
 ߚ ൌ ሾߚଵ, ߚଶ, … , ߚ௥ିଵሿ (10) 
Or 
 ݒ݁ܿሺߚሻ ൌ ቎ ఉభఉమ
⋮
ఉೝషభ
቏. (11) 
 
The kth element of ߚ௝ can be interpreted as: the increase in log-odds of falling 
into category j versus category j* resulting from a one-unit increase in the kth covariate, 
holding the other covariates constant.  
Table 17 displays results of a polytomous logistic regression where the response 
variable is  
 ௜ܻ ൌ ቐ
1	݂݅	ݐ݄݁	݀݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݅݊ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁ݏ																					
2	݂݅	ݐ݄݁	݀݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݀݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁ݏ																					
3	݂݅	ݐ݄݁	݀݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	ݎ݁݉ܽ݅݊ݏ	ݑ݄݊ܿܽ݊݃݁݀
 (12) 
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Table 15 
 
Summary Statistics of Dividend Determinants According to Dividend Paying Status 
 
The Total Assets are reported in millions of US dollars and are equal to the book value of total assets. Growth Opportunities 1 is calculated as the ratio of the 
market value of total capital to the book value of total assets ((book value of total assets-book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total 
assets). Growth Opportunities 2 is calculated as the percent change in assets over the quarter. Earned Equity is calculated as ratio of retained earnings to the 
book value of equity. Profitability 1 is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest to the book value of total assets. Profitability 2 is calculated as the 
ratio of after-tax earnings to the book value of equity. Firms are identified as non-dividend payers if they have not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution 
code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the last 12 quarters. Firms are identified as dividend payers if they paid a regular cash dividend in the previous 12 
quarters. If a firm has paid dividends irregularly within the most recent 12 quarters, it is identified as a “Switcher” firm. 
    Nonpayer   Payer   Switcher 
  Decrease Increase NoChange Decrease Increase NoChange Decrease Increase NoChange 
Total Assets 4,405.60 6,808.85 7,065.50 16,115.15 13,237.46 11,148.12 9,085.64 8,055.03 5,809.01 
Market Value 1,796.23 3,588.59 3,211.76 4,799.14 6,401.24 5,142.08 4,128.56 3,589.07 3,069.75 
Profitability 1 0.016 0.014 0.010 0.043 0.025 0.010 0.026 0.016 0.010 
Profitability 2 0.041 0.043 0.064 1.069 0.323 0.042 3.491 0.182 0.031 
Earned Equity 0.353 0.314 0.379 0.534 0.643 0.786 0.187 0.447 0.437 
Growth Opportunities 1 1.124 0.799 0.725 2.443 1.322 0.820 1.582 0.889 0.773 
Growth Opportunities 2   -19.420 -6.760 -1.389   -14.505 -3.214 -1.680   -9.867 -1.221 -0.269 
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Table 16 
 
Summary Statistics of Dividend Determinants According to Dividend Paying Status and 
Economic Cycle 
 
The Total Assets are reported in millions of US dollars and are equal to the book value of total assets. 
Growth Opportunities 1 is calculated as the ratio of the market value of total capital to the book value of 
total assets ((book value of total assets-book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total 
assets). Growth Opportunities 2 is calculated as the percent change in assets over the quarter. Earned 
Equity is calculated as ratio of retained earnings to the book value of equity. Profitability 1 is calculated as 
the ratio of earnings before interest to the book value of total assets. Profitability 2 is calculated as the ratio 
of after-tax earnings to the book value of equity. Firms are identified as non-dividend payers if they have 
not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the last 12 
quarters. Firms are identified as dividend payers if they paid a regular cash dividend in the previous 12 
quarters. If a firm has paid dividends irregularly within the most recent 12 quarters, it is identified as a 
“Switcher” firm. A quarter is labeled as expansion or recession if it is classified as such by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. According to the NBER recessions occurred between March 2001 and 
November 2001 and between December 2007 and June 2009. 
    Expansion   Recession 
  Decrease Increase No Change Decrease Increase No Change 
Nonpayer 
Total Assets 4,496.70 4,255.23 7,043.33 3,130.30 78,982.07 8,329.52 
Market Value 1,752.57 3,111.91 3,163.78 2,407.42 17,061.22 5,948.07 
Profitability 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 
Profitability 2 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.30 0.03 
Earned Equity 0.38 0.31 0.38 -0.03 0.37 0.53 
Growth Opportunities 1 1.10 0.78 0.73 1.40 1.45 0.60 
Growth Opportunities 2 -20.79 -4.88 -1.41 -0.25 -59.89 -0.01 
    
Payer 
Total Assets 7,904.54 12,900.51 10,364.01 45,971.93 15,691.21 15,706.58 
Market Value 5,034.00 6,049.81 4,963.28 3,945.10 8,960.50 6,181.54 
Profitability 1 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.01 
Profitability 2 1.30 0.27 0.05 0.24 0.68 -0.04 
Earned Equity 0.58 0.64 0.64 0.38 0.69 1.59 
Growth Opportunities 1 2.21 1.24 0.84 3.29 1.92 0.73 
Growth Opportunities 2 -6.12 -2.75 -1.66 -45.00 -6.59 -1.82 
    
Switcher 
Total Assets 6,949.95 7,490.64 5,423.61 21,454.82 12,261.51 8,478.20 
Market Value 4,132.21 3,369.97 2,857.71 4,107.45 5,222.01 4,538.30 
Profitability 1 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Profitability 2 0.48 0.12 0.03 20.95 0.67 0.02 
Earned Equity 0.43 0.45 0.44 -1.31 0.40 0.42 
Growth Opportunities 1 1.60 0.89 0.79 1.46 0.85 0.69 
Growth Opportunities 2   -10.56 -1.28 -0.29   -5.87 -0.76 -0.11 
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The predictors of interest include the firm’s dividend paying status, as described 
above, the state of the economy, the firm’s total assets, growth opportunities, earned 
equity, and profitability. 
The results of Panel 2 in Table 17 show that dividend paying status, economic 
conditions, and total assets have a discernable effect on dividend changes at the 0.01% 
level, and profitability has discernable effects on dividend changes at the 10% level. 
Growth opportunities and earned equity have no discernable effect on dividend changes. 
 The parameter estimates are displayed in Panel 3. The intercepts give the 
estimated log-odds for the reference group Status = Switcher. The estimated log-odds of a 
decrease versus not changing the dividend level is -4.60, and the estimated log-odds of an 
increase versus not changing the dividend level is -3.5.  Therefore, switchers are less 
likely to change the dividend level. Just as the Type III analysis implies, earned equity is 
not significant in determining a dividend increase, decrease, or no change. However, a 
one unit increase in growth opportunities is significantly related to a decrease in dividend 
levels. 
 Although the logistic regression results find a significant difference between 
dividend paying status, in terms of the change in dividend level, the difference between 
nonpayers and switcher is economically insignificant. On the other hand, dividend payers 
show more volatility in changing dividend levels. A dividend payer is 1.51% more likely 
than a switcher to decrease a dividend and 1.067% more likely to increase a dividend. 
The economy also plays a role in changes in the dividend level. In an expansion, a firm is 
0.74% less likely to decrease a dividend and 1.38% more likely to increase a dividend, 
versus leaving the dividend level unchanged. An increase in total assets leads to volatility 
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in dividend changes. A one unit increase in total assets, implies that firms are 1% more 
likely to both decrease or increase the dividend level, as opposed to not changing the 
dividend. As pointed out in previous literature, and implied by various results in this 
dissertation, an increase in growth opportunities implies a 1% increase in the likelihood 
that a firm will decrease a dividend, while a one unit increase in profitability implies a 
1.01% increase in the likelihood that a firm will increase the dividend level. 
The results provided above as well as those in chapter 1 of this dissertation, imply 
that dividend characteristics of firms are significantly different across dividend paying 
status and economic cycles. We now investigate differences in returns between regular 
dividend payers, non-dividend payers and switcher firms using the Fama and French 
three factor model. 
The Fama and French factors, SMB and HML, are formed on a monthly basis. 
Because we employ quarterly, rather than monthly returns, we form the factors on a 
quarterly basis using the Fama and French (1993) procedure.  
In order to sort the stocks according to dividend paying classification, we use the 
distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database. The description for this distribution code 
in the CRSP Data Description Guide is: U.S. cash dividend, quarterly, taxable same rate 
as dividend. We sort the stocks in 3 different categories as described previously: Regular 
Dividend Payer, Nonpayer, and Switcher. 
Table 18 displays summary statistics for the average excess return, market value, 
and book-to-market ratio. The results show average excess return to be highest for non-
dividend paying firms, which drives up the average for the sample including all types of  
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Table 17 
 
Generalized Logarithmic Regression With Growth Opportunities 1 and Profitability 1 and 
NBER Market Measure 
 
The probability modeled is that Change = ‘No Change’. Using a polytomous logit model, variables are 
selected using forward selection process. The Status effect is represented by the two binary variables: 
Nonpayer and Payer. The binary variable “Nonpayer” is equal to 1 if the firm has not paid a regular cash 
dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 
0 otherwise. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if the firm has paid a regular cash dividend 
(distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in all of the previous 12 quarters, and it is equal to 0 
otherwise. We measure the effect of the market according to the expansion and contractions defined by the 
NBER. The Economic Cycle effect is introduced as a binary variable called Expansion that is equal to 1 if 
the market is in an expansionary quarter and 0 when the market is in a contraction or recession period. 
Total Assets is the book value of total assets in the prior quarter. Growth Opportunities 1 is calculated as 
the ratio of the market value of total capital to the book value of total assets ((book value of total assets-
book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets) in the prior quarter. Profitability 
1 is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest to the book value of total assets in the prior quarter.  
 
Panel 1: Fit Statistics 
Criterion 
Intercept 
Only 
Intercept And 
Covariates 
AIC 207,509 149,422 
SC 207,531 149,600 
-2 Log L 207,505 149,390 
Panel 2: Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF 
Wald 
ChiSq 
Prob 
ChiSq 
Status 4 15,154.93 <.0001 
Economic Cycle 2 231.58 <.0001 
Total Assets 2 45.15 <.0001 
Growth Opportunities 1 2 3.83 0.147 
Earned Equity 2 1.01 0.605 
Profitability 1 2 5.45 0.066 
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Table 17 (continued) 
 
Panel 3: Parameter Estimates 
Variable ClassVal0 Response DF Estimate StdErr 
Wald 
ChiSq 
Prob 
ChiSq 
Intercept Decrease 1 -4.601 0.029 24,571.74 <.0001 
Intercept Increase 1 -3.501 0.019 35,904.48 <.0001 
Status Nonpayer Decrease 1 -2.870 0.049 3,427.29 <.0001 
Status Nonpayer Increase 1 -3.197 0.030 11,676.20 <.0001 
Status Payer Decrease 1 1.506 0.029 2,730.20 <.0001 
Status Payer Increase 1 1.631 0.017 9,535.32 <.0001 
Economic Cycle Expansion Decrease 1 -0.151 0.020 55.61 <.0001 
Economic Cycle Expansion Increase 1 0.161 0.013 161.32 <.0001 
Total Assets Decrease 1 0.000 0.000 23.66 <.0001 
Total Assets Increase 1 0.000 0.000 29.41 <.0001 
Growth Opportunities 1 Decrease 1 0.000 0.000 3.39 0.066 
Growth Opportunities 1 Increase 1 0.000 0.000 0.54 0.464 
Earned Equity Decrease 1 0.000 0.000 0.32 0.571 
Earned Equity Increase 1 0.000 0.000 0.68 0.411 
Profitability 1 Decrease 1 0.011 0.007 2.35 0.125 
Profitability 1   Increase 1 0.010 0.005 3.94 0.047 
Panel 4: Odds Ratio Estimates         
Effect Response OddsRatioEst LowerCL UpperCL 
Status               Nonpayer vs Switcher Decrease 0.014 0.012 0.017 
Status               Nonpayer vs Switcher Increase 0.009 0.008 0.009 
Status               Payer    vs Switcher Decrease 1.151 1.08 1.228 
Status               Payer    vs Switcher Increase 1.067 1.033 1.101 
EconomicCycle        Expansion vs 
Recession Decrease 0.74 0.683 0.801 
EconomicCycle        Expansion vs 
Recession Increase 1.38 1.313 1.45 
LTotalAssets Decrease 1 1 1 
LTotalAssets Increase 1 1 1 
LGrowthOpportunities Decrease 1 1 1.001 
LGrowthOpportunities Increase 1 1 1.001 
LEarnedEquity Decrease 1 1 1.001 
LEarnedEquity Increase 1 1 1 
LProfitability1 Decrease 1.011 0.997 1.025 
LProfitability1 Increase 1.01 1 1.021 
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firms. Firms that regularly pay dividends and firms that initiate dividends earn the lowest 
excess returns. 
Market value of the regular dividend paying group is far greater than the market 
value of all other groups. It is followed by the switcher group. This implies that large size 
is associated with dividend payments, as has been noted in previous literature. 
Variation in excess returns for non-dividend payers is very high, relative to its 
mean and to the standard deviation of other groups. It is also driving up the standard 
deviation of the sample that includes all firms. Average book-to-market ratio for non-
dividend payers is also much higher than for other groups, which seems to be driving up 
the average book-to-market ratio for the total sample. This implies that “value” stocks are 
concentrated in the nonpayer group, while the other groups consist of “growth” stocks. 
Table 19 displays the average excess return, market value, and book-to-market 
ratio as in Table 18, but divides the statistics by economic cycle, as classified by the 
NBER. According to the NBER, economic contractions in the United States include the 
time period between March 2001 and November 2001, as well as the period between 
December 2007 and June 2009.  
The results show that average excess return was highest for the non-dividend 
paying group in both the expansions and recessions. Average excess returns actually 
decrease for all groups except nonpayers. In fact, the average book-to-market ratio 
increased for all firms except nonpayers. In a market downturn, we would assume this 
implies a decrease in market value, but the data shows an increase in average market 
value. This implies that book value must have increased. An increase in book value can 
arise from an increase in assets or a decrease in liabilities. Increases in book value are  
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Table 18 
 
Summary Statistics: Excess Return, Market Value and Book-to-Market Ratio by 
Dividend-Paying Status (1990 - 2009) 
  
Excess return is calculated as the difference between the firms quarterly return and the three-month T-bill rate. Market 
value is calculated as the product of the number of shares outstanding and the close price at the end of the quarter. 
Book-to-market ratio is calculated as the ratio of Book Equity to Market Value at the end of the quarter. Book Equity is 
the sum of common equity and deferred taxes on the balance sheet at the end of the quarter. During the period between 
1993 and 2009 the number of regular dividend payers ranged from a minimum of 427 in the fourth quarter of 2000 to a 
maximum of 1,428 in the first quarter of 1997. During the same time period, the number of switchers ranged from a 
minimum of 275 in second quarter of 2009 to maximum of 1,103 in the second quarter of 1999. Non-dividend payers 
ranged from 3,103 in the second quarter of 2009 to 5,226 in the first quarter of 1997. 
 
Sample 
Avg Excess 
Return 
StdDev Excess 
Return 
Avg Market 
Value 
Avg Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
All 0.13 22.26 1813 4.89 
Regular 0.01 0.16 11470 0.56 
Switcher 0.02 0.39 3778 0.75 
Nonpayer 0.19 27.49 900 8.32 
 
usually related to increases in earnings. This is surprising considering the market 
downturn. 
Table 20 shows regression results for the Fama-French three-factor model 
regressions by type of dividend payer. Although nonpayers had higher excess returns, as 
show in Tables 18 and 19, regular dividend payers have significantly higher abnormal 
returns than other types of firms. Although not significant, the abnormal return for 
nonpayers is -0.005, while regular payers have an abnormal return of 0.007 at the 1% 
level. Switchers also experience significantly higher abnormal returns of 0.009 at the 
10% level. The R-square for switcher firms may be low due to the type of firms in those 
groups and the number of observations in each group. Although the market factor is 
significant for the switcher firms, the size and book-to-market ratio factors are not. It may 
be that the switcher firms, may be midsize or larger firms that do not have returns related 
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Table 19 
Summary Statistics: Excess Return, Market Value and Book-to-Market Ratio by 
Dividend-Paying Status and Time (1990 - 2009) 
 
Excess return is calculated as the difference between the firms quarterly return and the three-month T-bill rate. Market 
value is calculated as the product of the number of shares outstanding and the close price at the end of the quarter. 
Book-to-market ratio is calculated as the ratio of Book Equity to Market Value at the end of the quarter. Book Equity is 
the sum of common equity and deferred taxes on the balance sheet at the end of the quarter. During the period between 
1993 and 2009 the number of regular dividend payers ranged from a minimum of 427 in the fourth quarter of 2000 to a 
maximum of 1,428 in the first quarter of 1997. During the same time period, the number of switchers ranged from a 
minimum of 275 in second quarter of 2009 to maximum of 1,103 in the second quarter of 1999. Non-dividend payers 
ranged from 3,103 in the second quarter of 2009 to 5,226 in the first quarter of 1997. We divide the samples into two 
time periods to distinguish between recession and non-recession periods. According to the NBER, the US experienced 
economic contractions in the periods March 2001 – November 2001 and December 2007 – June 2009. 
 
Economic Cycle 
Avg Excess 
Return 
StdDev Excess 
Return 
Avg Market 
Value 
Avg Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
All 
Expansion 0.141 23.396 1718 5.879 
Recession 0.063 2.280 2675 6.188 
Regular 
Expansion 0.005 0.153 10996 0.542 
Recession 0.001 0.226 15370 0.669 
Switcher 
Expansion 0.017 0.394 3563 0.723 
Recession -0.003 0.391 6173 1.011 
Nonpayer 
Expansion 0.204 28.874 851 8.524 
Recession 0.339 19.661 1412 6.557 
 
to small size. They may also not have high book-to-market ratios, as seen in Table 18. 
Once we divide the samples according to economic cycle, in Table 21, abnormal 
return no longer seems significant. However, it is interesting that during recessions, 
regular dividend payers have a positive abnormal return of 0.006 at the 5% level. 
Although the results show an abnormal return of 0.402 for non-dividend payers, it is not 
significantly different from zero. 
The Fama-French factors do not seem to be significant for other groups, except 
the regular dividend payers.  
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Table 20 
Fama-French Three Factor Regressions by Dividend-Paying Status (1990-2009) 
 
Quarterly returns are calculated for every NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq firms. They are then sorted by size and book-to-
market to form six portfolios to generate the factors SMB and HML. Size is the market value for each firm at the end of 
the quarter and BE/ME is the ratio of book equity to market equity, where BE is calculated from the Compustat 
database as in Fama and French (1993). Regression results for the Fama-French three-factor model Ri = ai + bi(Rm-Rf) 
+ siSMB + hiHML + ei are shown below. During the period between 1993 and 2009 the number of regular dividend 
payers ranged from a minimum of 427 in the fourth quarter of 2000 to a maximum of 1,428 in the first quarter of 1997. 
During the same time period, the number of switchers ranged from a minimum of 275 in second quarter of 2009 to 
maximum of 1,103 in the second quarter of 1999. Non-dividend payers ranged from 3,103 in the second quarter of 
2009 to 5,226 in the first quarter of 1997. 
 
Estimated Parameter Values T-Values 
R-Sq Sample a b s h a b s h 
All 0.049 0.747 0.381 -0.189 1.665 2.663 2.823 -2.071 25.73 
Regular 0.007 0.616 -0.093 0.064 2.520 22.677 -7.636 7.937 22.91 
Switcher 0.009 0.600 0.011 0.007 1.676 11.053 0.496 0.484 7.37 
Nonpayer -0.005 1.287 0.732 -0.084 -0.182 4.955 6.316 -1.095 78.40 
 
There is a concern with the data. There were only a few quarters that the NBER 
classified as economic contractions. On the other hand, we have many observations 
during economic expansions. Regression results for the recession periods may be affected 
by the limited number of periods classified as contractions. However, there are a large 
number of firms in each group. Of course, the non-dividend payers have a much higher 
number of observations in each quarter. Therefore, the data for nonpayer is more 
approximate to normal. 
Table 22 provides descriptive statistics regarding the dividend changes and daily 
returns associated those changes. Panel 1 of Table 22 provides descriptive statistics for 
the rate of change in the dividend levels, the average returns, and excess returns. The 
largest dividend decreases seem to come from Switcher firms. The largest dividend 
increases can also be attributed to Switcher firms. It may be that firms do not have a 
history of paying dividends regularly, and only pay in instances when it benefits the firm. 
For example, Switcher firms may pay dividends when the firm has excess cash flow or  
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Table 21 
Fama-French Three Factor Regressions by Dividend-Paying Status and Time (1990-
2009) 
Quarterly returns are calculated for every NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq firms. They are then sorted by size and book-to-
market to form six portfolios to generate the factors SMB and HML. Size is the market value for each firm at the end of 
the quarter and BE/ME is the ratio of book equity to market equity, where BE is calculated from the Compustat 
database as in Fama and French (1993). Regression results for the Fama-French three-factor model Ri  = ai + bi(Rm-Rf) 
+ siSMB + hiHML + ei are shown below. During the period between 1993 and 2009 the number of regular dividend 
payers ranged from a minimum of 427 in the fourth quarter of 2000 to a maximum of 1,428 in the first quarter of 1997. 
During the same time period, the number of switchers ranged from a minimum of 275 in second quarter of 2009 to 
maximum of 1,103 in the second quarter of 1999. Non-dividend payers ranged from 3,103 in the second quarter of 
2009 to 5,226 in the first quarter of 1997. We divide the samples into two time periods to distinguish between recession 
and non-recession periods. According to the NBER, the US experienced economic contractions in the periods March 
2001 – November 2001 and December 2007 – June 2009. 
 
Estimated Parameter Values T-Values 
R-Sq Sample a b s h   a b s h 
All 
Expansion -0.009 1.029 0.506 -0.058 -0.442 4.622 5.798 -0.995 77.98 
Recession 0.086 1.573 0.112 -0.015 1.287 4.778 0.249 -0.032 92.39 
Regular 
Expansion -0.006 0.841 -0.080 0.437 -0.360 10.561 -0.738 3.862 65.02 
Recession 0.006 0.497 -0.074 0.051 1.986 16.308 -6.192 6.466 14.88 
Switcher 
Expansion 0.011 0.597 -0.025 0.021 1.406 7.291 -0.791 0.970 44.64 
Recession -0.014 1.016 0.076 0.524 -0.313 4.643 0.255 1.685 94.52 
Nonpayer 
Expansion -0.016 1.218 0.763 -0.103 -0.516 3.853 6.155 -1.253 78.32 
Recession 0.402 0.477 -0.582 1.305 1.022 0.245 -0.218 0.471 0.51 
 
when firm managers see the need to signal to investors (Fuller and Blau, 2010). In 
examining the average returns on day -1, day 0, and day 1 (day 0 is the declaration day), 
we can see that the average return is higher surrounding a dividend increase, and lower 
(even negative in some cases) surrounding a dividend decrease. The same can be said 
when examining excess return. 
Panels 2 and 3 are similar to Panel 1, but Panel 2 examines economic expansions, 
while Panel 3 examines economic recessions. In Panel 2, average returns are lowest 
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surrounding a dividend decrease, but for the most part, remain positive. On the other 
hand, average returns and excess returns are all negative surrounding a dividend decrease 
in Panel 3. Comparing returns surrounding dividend increases across Panels 1 through 3, 
we can see that returns are much higher in Panel 3. Returns and excess returns are also 
higher during the recessions for firms that did not change their dividend. It may be that 
investors saw steady dividend levels as positive signs and dividend increases, as 
extremely positive signals. 
 The results in Panel 2, during expansions, imply that investors are not too 
concerned with dividend decreases during expansions. When economic conditions are 
promising, negative information such as dividend decreases may not be highlighted in the 
financial news, and therefore, it may be dismissed by investors. On the other hand, 
economic contractions increase uncertainty and volatility. Any information, such as 
dividend announcements, is followed by large reactions in returns. This supports they 
study by Lee (1995) that finds investor overreaction to temporary dividend changes. 
Because investors cannot distinguish between permanent or temporary changes, they 
react strongly especially in times of uncertainty. 
  
 
 
85 
 
Table 22 
Descriptive Statistics for Dividend Changes and Associated Returns 
R∆Div is the rate of change in quarterly dividend per share. R is cumulative stock return during days -1, 0, 
and 1 relative to the dividend declaration. ER is R minus contemporaneous return on the CRSP index. 
 
Panel 1: Descriptive Statistics for Dividend Event Changes 
All Sample Regular Switcher 
    Mean SD       Mean SD     Mean SD 
Dividend Decreases 
R∆Div -0.144 0.185 -0.144 0.116 -0.146 0.185 
R 0.000 0.036 0.002 0.032 0.000 0.034 
ER 0.000 0.033 0.001 0.030 0.000 0.032 
No Change 
R 0.001 0.029 0.001 0.024 0.001 0.028 
ER 0.001 0.028 0.001 0.022 0.001 0.027 
Dividend Increases 
R∆Div 0.073 0.145 0.023 0.033 0.080 0.151 
R 0.003 0.031 0.002 0.024 0.002 0.027 
ER 0.002 0.030 0.002 0.022 0.002 0.026 
All Dividend Events 
R∆Div 0.000 0.105 -0.001 0.036 0.000 0.113 
R 0.002 0.030 0.001 0.025 0.001 0.028 
ER 0.001 0.029 0.001 0.023 0.001 0.027 
Panel 2: Descriptive Statistics for Dividend Event Changes during Economic Expansion 
All Sample Regular Switcher 
    Mean SD       Mean SD     Mean SD 
 Dividend Decreases
R∆Div -0.142 0.218 -0.140 0.098 -0.159 0.253 
R 0.001 0.030 0.003 0.025 0.001 0.030 
ER 0.000 0.029 0.003 0.024 0.000 0.029 
No Change 
R 0.001 0.026 0.001 0.022 0.001 0.026 
ER 0.001 0.026 0.001 0.021 0.001 0.026 
Dividend Increases 
R∆Div 0.088 0.189 0.026 0.057 0.095 0.211 
R 0.002 0.026 0.002 0.021 0.002 0.026 
ER 0.002 0.025 0.002 0.021 0.002 0.026 
All Dividend Events 
R∆Div -0.007 0.144 -0.001 0.041 -0.010 0.164 
R 0.002 0.026 0.001 0.022 0.002 0.026 
ER 0.001 0.026 0.001 0.021 0.001 0.026 
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Table 22 (continued) 
 
Panel 3: Descriptive Statistics for Dividend Event Changes during Economic Recession 
All Sample Regular Switcher 
    Mean SD       Mean SD     Mean SD 
Dividend Decreases 
R∆Div -0.145 0.177 -0.144 0.118 -0.145 0.174 
R -0.001 0.050 -0.005 0.059 -0.002 0.052 
ER -0.002 0.044 -0.007 0.053 -0.002 0.044 
No Change 
R 0.002 0.047 0.000 0.042 0.001 0.046 
ER 0.002 0.042 0.001 0.033 0.001 0.040 
Dividend Increases 
R∆Div 0.072 0.139 0.023 0.030 0.079 0.146 
R 0.003 0.057 0.003 0.042 0.002 0.035 
ER 0.003 0.054 0.004 0.034 0.001 0.028 
All Dividend Events 
R∆Div 0.001 0.100 -0.001 0.036 0.001 0.108 
R 0.001 0.050 0.001 0.043 0.001 0.044 
ER 0.001 0.045 0.001 0.034 0.001 0.038 
 
3.6. Summary and Conclusions 
Using logistic regressions, and controlling for various determining factors of 
dividend payment identified in previous literature, we found that the dividend paying 
history of a firm as well as the economic cycle determines whether a firm will change the 
level of the dividend. Switcher firms are less likely to change dividend levels, but when 
they do change dividend levels, they tend to change them by large amounts. Regular 
dividend payers, on the other hand, are more likely to change dividend levels, but by 
smaller amounts. Expansions are also likely to cause increases in dividend levels, but this 
may be due to the likelihood of switchers and nonpayers initiating and increasing 
dividend levels. 
We have seen that the importance of the factors that are used to explain returns, 
namely, the market risk premium, SMB, and HML, change with the dividend paying 
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status of the firms. These factors seem to be significant for firms that regularly pay 
dividend, or sporadically pay dividends (switcher firms), but are not significant for 
nonpayer firms. 
Although non-dividend paying firms have higher returns in excess of the risk free 
rate, dividend paying firms and switcher firms have positive and significant abnormal 
returns. Nonpayer firms have abnormal returns that are not significantly different from 
zero. 
We established that Switcher firms issue the largest average dividend decreases, 
as well as the largest average dividend increases. The results also show that average 
returns and average excess returns are lower surrounding a dividend decrease declaration, 
and higher surrounding a dividend increase declaration. In comparing average returns and 
average excess returns (daily frequency) before and during the market downturn, we see 
that the market reacts more to dividend events during the downturn. In fact, returns were 
much lower and always negative surrounding a dividend decreases. On the other hand, 
they were much higher surrounding a dividend increase. Even if firms did not change 
their dividend levels, returns surrounding dividend declarations were higher during the 
downturn. Apparently, the effect of a dividend change is affected by the state of the 
economy. The results show a magnification effect when the economy is in a bad state. 
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CHAPTER 4: DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND INCREASES OR DECREASES OF 
ADRs AND THE EFFECTS ON RETURNS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Examination of a typical dividend paying firm will reveal that dividends are paid 
quarterly and the amount of cash dividend per share does not fluctuate, in fact it usually 
remains at the same level for very long periods of time. In most cases, a dividend paying 
firm has a very long history of paying dividends. Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely 
(2005) find that most regular, dividend-paying firms continue to pay dividends because 
they feel obligated to do so due to their long history of paying dividends. In fact, they no 
longer adhere to target dividend payout ratios, instead they rely on past dividend levels 
when determining the firm’s distribution policy. 
Many studies have found a decreasing number of dividend paying firms (Skinner 
(2008); DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004); Fama and French (2001)). Instead of 
cash dividends, more and more firms are using stock repurchases.  
However, if regular-dividend paying firms are relying on past dividend levels in 
determining the firm’s distribution policy, then a change in the dividend level of these 
firms should imply important information about the firm itself. This is especially true 
when investors are uncertain about future market conditions. Uncertainty is even greater 
for a foreign based firm, especially if the firm is based in an emerging market. The recent 
market downturn also increased uncertainty, implying that any dividend changes indicate 
fundamental changes of important consequences for the firm’s future. 
The literature regarding American Depository Receipts is abundant. There are 
many studies that examine the reasons for foreign firms cross-listing in the US. Other 
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studies examine the differences between firms in the various ADR levels. A few examine 
returns behavior of ADRs surrounding the ex-dividend day. Denis and Osobov (2008) 
provide evidence on the determinants of dividend policy on an international scale, but 
only look at developed markets. Very few studies have examined the determinants of 
dividend changes, and as far as we know, this is the first study to identify the 
determinants of dividend changes in both developed and emerging markets. Even fewer 
studies have examined the effect of dividend changes on returns.  
This study identifies determinants of a change in dividend levels of foreign firms 
trading on US exchanges in the forms of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) (See the 
Appendix for a primer on ADRs).  An additional innovative aspect of this paper is our 
examination the effects of changes in dividend levels on returns based on the dividend 
paying status of the firm (regular, switcher, or nonpayer). 
4.2. Review of Literature 
It is widely accepted that cross-listing increase market integration, and many 
argue that it can improve market quality in emerging markets. Forester and Karolyi 
(1998, 2000) and Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998), as well as others find that 
cross-listing increases competition for order flow, which improves liquidity. Decreases in 
cost of capital due to stricter disclosure standards and better legal protection in the US 
have also been associated with cross-listing (Moel, 1999). More recent studies (Moel, 
2001) have found that ADRs originating from emerging markets are related to the 
weakening of the home markets. 
Karolyi (2004) reexamines the role of ADRs in the development of emerging 
markets. Contrary to previous findings that ADRs lead to the deterioration of the 
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financial markets in the emerging markets, he finds evidence that firms list abroad 
because of the poor and deteriorating quality of financial markets in the home country. 
ADRs are an effect of weakening home markets rather than a cause of them. 
Although, markets have become increasingly open and capital flows have become 
more fluid, the degree of market segmentation may still be an important determinant of 
ADR returns. Harvey (1995) finds that local information plays a larger role in emerging 
markets than in developed markets. Choi and Kim (2000) also find the MSCI Index to 
have low explanatory power for emerging markets. 
Previous studies have found that country factors and macro-economic factors are 
significant factors that differentiate returns on US stocks and returns on ADRs. Jiang 
(1998) and Bekaert and Urias (1999) make the case for ADRs as diversification tools. 
Jiang (1998) identifies a “country” element and a “currency” element that provide 
diversification. Lesssard (1974) and Roll (1992) argue that diversification benefits come 
from industrial structure, while Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994), Griffin and Karolyi 
(1998), and Choi and Kim (2000) find that diversification also comes from country 
factors or economic policy differences such as interest rate policies, national deficits, 
monetary policies, and economic growth. Using different multifactor models to explain 
ADR returns, Patro (2000) also notes that home country returns are important. He finds 
that a model with home country returns and world returns as risk factors performs better 
than a model with either factor alone. 
Studies related to dividends with respect to ADRs only examine the ex-dividend 
day in an attempt to measure dividend recapture. Gorman, Mahajan, and Weigand (2004) 
compare dividend recapture in ADRs to dividend recapture in US stocks. They find that 
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ex-day returns for ADRs are higher than the returns for comparable US firm. Also, 
volume is lower for ADRs than for US firms. They present evidence that a foreign risk 
premium cannot be the only cause for the higher returns. This implies that dividend 
recapture is being hindered by other factors. Although they do not expand on the idea, 
they suggest that differences in dividend payment policies among the different countries 
may be causing the differences between US stock and ADR ex-day returns. 
4.3. Data 
Daily data on returns of US stocks and ADRs trading on the NYSE, Nasdaq, and 
AMEX exchanges, and issued by the Bank of New York Mellon, is gathered from the 
CRSP database. Data on dividend announcement dates is also available from the CRSP 
database. Data on the cash dividend amounts are available from the Compustat database.  
In order to be included in our sample, data on returns must be available from the 
CRSP database and fundamental data must be available from the COMPUSTAT 
database. As in the previous chapters, a firm is classified as a dividend payer if it has paid 
a dividend classified as a “regular, quarterly, cash dividend” and coded as “1232” by the 
CRSP database in every quarter for the previous twelve quarters. If the firm paid 
dividends sporadically over the previous twelve quarters, then it is classified as a switcher 
firm. If a firm paid no dividends coded as “1232,” in the previous twelve quarters, then it 
is classified as a non-dividend paying firm. 
As previous studies have shown, country factors have high explanatory powers 
for ADR returns. This leads us to believe that such country factors may also be important 
determinants of dividend changes for ADRs. Therefore, we create a quarterly measure for 
economic recession for each country using various macro-economic factors. From the 
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Datastream database, we gather data on various economic indicators in order to 
determine the economic conditions in the various home countries of the ADRs. We 
gather data on unemployment, GDP, GNI, retail sales, and industrial production. We 
define an economic recession as two consecutive quarters of a decline in GDP, GNI, 
retail sales, and industrial production, along with two consecutive quarters of an increase 
in the unemployment rate. This measure is used in attempt to examine whether these 
factors are related to the propensity to pay dividends and to dividend level changes. 
4.4. Methodology 
The main contribution of this chapter is to identify the determinants of dividend 
payment and dividend level changes for American Depository Receipts. This is especially 
challenging because these securities represent ownership in shares of non-U.S. 
companies. Although they’re priced in dollars and pay dividends in dollars, the value of 
ADRs really depends on the value of the foreign firm and conditions in foreign markets. 
Another difficulty is introduced by the very few regular, quarterly, cash dividends paid 
by ADRs.  
Table 23 shows that between 1990 and 2009, there were only a couple hundred 
dividend payments made by regular dividend payers and switchers each. Between 1993 
and 2009, only 549 regular, cash dividend distributions were paid by American 
Depository Receipts. Most were classified as switchers, implying that very few paid 
dividends regularly. Of those firms that paid dividends, only a handful changed the 
dividend level. About seven percent of payers and just two percent of switchers increased 
the dividend level, while not even 1% or either regular payers or switchers decreased 
dividend payments. 
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Table 23 
 
Number of Dividend Changes, ADRs (1993Q1 – 2009Q2) 
 
Firms are identified as non-dividend payers if they have not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code 
“1232” in the CRSP database) within the last 12 quarters. Firms are identified as dividend payers if they 
paid a regular cash dividend in the previous 12 quarters. If a firm has paid dividends irregularly within the 
most recent 12 quarters, it is identified as a “Switcher” firm. 
 
Status Decrease Increase No Change 
Nonpayer 1 33.33% 0 0.00% 2 66.67% 
Payer 2 0.83% 17 7.05% 222 92.12% 
Switcher 3 0.98% 7 2.30% 295 96.72% 
 
Table 24 shows how some quarters had no dividends paid by an ADR. In most 
cases, only a few firms paid dividends. The number of firms that paid a regular, quarterly 
cash dividend ranged from zero to just twelve between 1993 and 2009. One noticeable 
trend is that the number of dividend payments from American Depository Receipts 
increased through time. This is surprising, as studies have shown the number of dividend 
paying firms to be decreasing among U.S. firms. 
Although regular, quarterly cash dividends are not common among ADRs, they 
are quote volatile, and are paid without consistency by the firms. Table 25 displays 
summary statistics for dividend payments made between 1993 and 2009. Panel 1 focuses 
on the dividend payment per share. Regular, quarterly cash dividend payments of ADRs 
are similar in amount to those of U.S. firms.  
Panel 2 highlights changes in the dividend level from one quarter to the another, 
while Panel 3 shows summary statistics of the percentage change in dividend levels from 
quarter to quarter. Although the average change in dividends is only 1% for regular 
dividend payers, it is a large 12.41% for a firm that pays dividends sporadically. Large 
 
 
94 
 
Table 24 
 
Number of Dividend Changes Over Time, ADRs (1993Q1 – 2009Q2) 
 
Firms are identified as non-dividend payers if they have not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code 
“1232” in the CRSP database) within the last 12 quarters. Firms are identified as dividend payers if they 
paid a regular cash dividend in the previous 12 quarters. If a firm has paid dividends irregularly within the 
most recent 12 quarters, it is identified as a “Switcher” firm. 
 
Panel 1: Dividend Changes for Dividend Payers 
Year & 
Quarter 
Decrease Increase No 
Change 
  Year & 
Quarter 
Decrease Increase No 
Change 
1993Q1   2  2001Q2    
1993Q2  3 2001Q3    
1993Q3 1 2001Q4  2
1993Q4   1  2002Q1    
1994Q1   1  2002Q2   1 
1994Q2   2  2002Q3   1 
1994Q3   5  2002Q4 1  3 
1994Q4   3  2003Q1   2 
1995Q1   2  2003Q2   4 
1995Q2     2003Q3   4 
1995Q3   3  2003Q4   4 
1995Q4  1 1  2004Q1   4 
1996Q1   1  2004Q2  1 6 
1996Q2   5  2004Q3   4 
1996Q3   2  2004Q4   5 
1996Q4     2005Q1  1 3 
1997Q1     2005Q2  1 6 
1997Q2     2005Q3   4 
1997Q3   2  2005Q4   6 
1997Q4  1   2006Q1  2 3 
1998Q1   1  2006Q2  1 7 
1998Q2   1  2006Q3   5 
1998Q3     2006Q4   7 
1998Q4     2007Q1 1 2 4 
1999Q1   2  2007Q2   8 
1999Q2   1  2007Q3   6 
1999Q3   1  2007Q4   7 
1999Q4   2  2008Q1  2 5 
2000Q1     2008Q2  1 6 
2000Q2   1  2008Q3   6 
2000Q3     2008Q4   6 
2000Q4   1  2009Q1  2 5 
2001Q1     2   2009Q2   1 6 
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Table 24 (continued) 
 
Panel 2: Dividend Changes for Switchers 
Year & 
Quarter 
Decrease Increase No 
Change   
Year & 
Quarter 
Decrease Increase No 
Change 
1993Q1   2 2001Q2   4 
1993Q2 2 2001Q3    
1993Q3 2 2001Q4   4 
1993Q4   2 2002Q1   3 
1994Q1   1 2002Q2    
1994Q2  2 2002Q3 3 
1994Q3  2 2002Q4  1 9 
1994Q4    2003Q1   4 
1995Q1    2003Q2  1 7 
1995Q2   1 2003Q3   4 
1995Q3    2003Q4   5 
1995Q4   1 2004Q1   4 
1996Q1   1 2004Q2   6 
1996Q2   2 2004Q3   4 
1996Q3    2004Q4  1 2 
1996Q4   1 2005Q1   6 
1997Q1    2005Q2   6 
1997Q2   3 2005Q3  1 4 
1997Q3   1 2005Q4   8 
1997Q4   5 2006Q1   4 
1998Q1    2006Q2   6 
1998Q2   3 2006Q3   5 
1998Q3   3 2006Q4   8 
1998Q4   1 2007Q1   3 
1999Q1   4 2007Q2   9 
1999Q2   2 2007Q3   6 
1999Q3   3 2007Q4   9 
1999Q4   1 2008Q1   8 
2000Q1   3 2008Q2  1 11 
2000Q2   5 2008Q3   10 
2000Q3   2 2008Q4 2  10 
2000Q4    2009Q1   12 
2001Q1     3   2009Q2 1 1 7 
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Table 25 
 
Summary Statistics of Dividend Payment Level, Change, and Percentage Change, ADRs 
Firms are identified as non-dividend payers if they have not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code 
“1232” in the CRSP database) within the last 12 quarters. Firms are identified as dividend payers if they 
paid a regular cash dividend in the previous 12 quarters. If a firm has paid dividends irregularly within the 
most recent 12 quarters, it is identified as a “Switcher” firm. 
 
Panel 1: Dividend Payment 
Status Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Nonpayer 0.30 0.18 0.03 0.84 
Dividend Payer 0.34 0.34 0.02 1.00 
Switcher 0.20 0.13 0.02 0.84 
Panel 2: Dividend Change 
Status Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Nonpayer 0.039 0 0 0.116 
Dividend Payer 0.002 0 0 0.120 
Switcher 0.019 0 0 0.253 
Panel 3: Dividend Percent Change 
Status Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Nonpayer 5.36% 0.00% 0.00% 16.09% 
Dividend Payer 1.05% 0.00% 0.00% 71.43% 
Switcher 12.41% 0.00% 0.00% 139.55% 
 
swings in dividend payments are also evident among all types of firms. Even regular 
dividend paying firms have changed their dividend by as much as 71.43%, while 
switchers have made a 139.55% change. Such wide swings stem from the very few 
dividend payments among ADRs. 
In order to determine if an American Depository Receipt will increase, decrease, 
or leave the dividend level unchanged, a polytomous logistic regression is used. This type 
of regression allows us to use a dependent variable of two or more responses. 
As in Chapter 2, our response row is 
 ݕ௜ ൌ ሺݕ௜ଵ, ݕ௜ଶ, … , ݕ௜௥ሻ் (8) 
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We assume a multinomial distribution with index ݊௜ ൌ ∑ ݕ௜௝௥௝ୀଵ  and parameter 
ߨ௜ ൌ ሺߨ௜ଵ, ߨ௜ଶ, … , ߨ௜௥ሻ். We relate ߨ௜ to covariates through a set of r-1 baseline-category 
logits. Taking j* as the baseline category, the model is  
 ݈݋݃ ൬ గ೔ೕగ೔ೕ∗൰ ൌ ݔ௜் ߚ௝,							݆ ് ݆
∗. (9) 
If xi has length p, then the model has ሺݎ െ 1ሻ ൈ ݌ free parameters, which we can 
arrange as a matrix or a vector. The last category is the baseline ሺ݆∗ ൌ ݎሻ, so the 
coefficients are  
 ߚ ൌ ሾߚଵ, ߚଶ, … , ߚ௥ିଵሿ (10) 
Or 
 ݒ݁ܿሺߚሻ ൌ ቎ ఉభఉమ
⋮
ఉೝషభ
቏. (11) 
The kth element of ߚ௝ can be interpreted as: the increase in log-odds of falling 
into category j versus category j* resulting from a one-unit increase in the kth covariate, 
holding the other covariates constant. 
4.5. Empirical Results 
The predictors of interest include the firm’s dividend paying status, the state of 
the economy, the firm’s total assets, growth opportunities, earned equity, and 
profitability. Table 26 displays the mean values for total assets, market value, 
profitability, earned equity, and growth opportunities according to the dividend paying 
status of the firm and whether the firm has increased, decreased, or left the dividend level 
unchanged. Because there were only three instances where a non-dividend paying firms 
paid dividends, there is also a column labeled “Never Paid” for the nonpayer status, 
which allows for comparison of firms that never paid dividends. 
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Of the firms that paid dividends, regular dividend paying firms had the highest 
average total assets, market value, profitability, earned equity, and even growth 
opportunities. This is a bit surprising because high growth opportunities have been 
associated with a lower probability of dividend payment. This may be explained by the 
fact that these ADR firms are still expanding into the world markets, so reimbursement, 
rather than distribution, of earnings is more important. Also, the table shows that regular 
dividend paying firms with the highest growth opportunities decreased dividends, most 
likely to increase reinvestment and take advantage of the growth opportunities available. 
The same can be said of switcher firms, which seem to exhibit the same pattern. 
Non-dividend paying ADRs that have never paid a dividend display some 
surprising characteristics. They have, by far, the highest total assets, market value, 
profitability, and earned equity; all characteristics that are associated with dividend 
payment. Growth opportunities are high, but similar to those of regular dividend payers. 
Table 27 introduces economic conditions and allows us to see how determinants 
of dividends are different depending on the state of the economy and the dividend paying 
status of the firm. Naturally, during a recession, total assets and market value are lower, 
on average. Surprisingly, profitability, earned equity, and growth opportunities are 
higher, on average, during a recession. Average profitability and earned equity are also 
higher for regular dividend payers during a recession. What is surprising, however, is the 
increase in average total assets seen during recessions. This is also exhibited in Chapter 2 
with U.S. firms. Dividend paying firms may be viewed as safer stocks during a recession. 
This may be occur even more so for ADRs. ADRs tend to be the largest, most 
profitable within their home country. Cross-listing on a major exchange like the NYSE,
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Table 26 
 
Summary Statistics of Dividend Determinants According to Dividend Paying Status, ADRs 
 
The Total Assets are reported in millions of US dollars and are equal to the book value of total assets. Growth Opportunities 1 is calculated as the ratio of the 
market value of total capital to the book value of total assets ((book value of total assets-book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total 
assets). Growth Opportunities 2 is calculated as the percent change in assets over the quarter. Earned Equity is calculated as ratio of retained earnings to the 
book value of equity. Profitability 1 is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest to the book value of total assets. Profitability 2 is calculated as the 
ratio of after-tax earnings to the book value of equity. Firms are identified as non-dividend payers if they have not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution 
code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the last 12 quarters. Firms are identified as dividend payers if they paid a regular cash dividend in the previous 12 
quarters. If a firm has paid dividends irregularly within the most recent 12 quarters, it is identified as a “Switcher” firm. 
 
    Nonpayer   Payer   Switcher 
Decrease Increase 
No 
Change 
Never 
Paid Decrease Increase 
No 
Change Decrease Increase 
No 
Change 
Total Assets 5,116.00 - 9,767.90 69,908.67 16,115.15 13,237.46 11,148.12 9,085.64 8,055.03 5,809.01 
Market Value 3,619.50 - 2,516.17 19,542.77 4,799.14 6,401.24 5,142.08 4,128.56 3,589.07 3,069.75 
Profitability 1 0.022 - -0.004 0.014 0.043 0.025 0.010 0.026 0.016 0.010 
Profitability 2 0.043 - -0.030 76.225 1.069 0.323 0.042 3.491 0.182 0.031 
Earned Equity 0.136 - -0.048 2198.762 0.534 0.643 0.786 0.187 0.447 0.437 
Growth Opportunities 1 0.707 - 0.769 1.579 2.443 1.322 0.820 1.582 0.889 0.773 
Growth Opportunities 2   0.000 - -0.002 -1.201   -14.505 -3.214 -1.680   -9.867 -1.221 -0.269 
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Table 27 
 
Summary Statistics of Dividend Determinants According to Dividend Paying Status and Economic Cycle, ADRs 
 
The Total Assets are reported in millions of US dollars and are equal to the book value of total assets. Growth Opportunities 1 is calculated as the ratio of the 
market value of total capital to the book value of total assets ((book value of total assets-book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total 
assets). Growth Opportunities 2 is calculated as the percent change in assets over the quarter. Earned Equity is calculated as ratio of retained earnings to the 
book value of equity. Profitability 1 is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest to the book value of total assets. Profitability 2 is calculated as the 
ratio of after-tax earnings to the book value of equity. Firms are identified as non-dividend payers if they have not paid a regular cash dividend (distribution 
code “1232” in the CRSP database) within the last 12 quarters. Firms are identified as dividend payers if they paid a regular cash dividend in the previous 12 
quarters. If a firm has paid dividends irregularly within the most recent 12 quarters, it is identified as a “Switcher” firm. A quarter is labeled as expansion or 
recession if it is classified as such by the National Bureau of Economic Research. According to the NBER recessions occurred between March 2001 and 
November 2001 and between December 2007 and June 2009. 
 
    Expansion   Recession 
Decrease Increase No Change Never Paid   Decrease Increase No Change Never Paid 
Nonpayer 
Total Assets 5,116.00 - 9,767.90 40,263.70 - - - 39,235.04 
Market Value 3,619.50 - 2,516.17 17,461.39 - - - 17,054.64 
Profitability 1 0.02 - 0.00 0.02 - - - 0.02 
Profitabilty 2 0.04 - -0.03 0.02 - - - 0.04 
Earned Equity 0.14 - -0.05 0.21 - - - 0.34 
Growth Opportunities 1 0.71 - 0.77 2.04 - - - 1.22 
Growth Opportunities 2 0.00 - 0.00 -0.84 - - - -0.24 
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Table 27 (continued) 
 
    Expansion   Recession 
Decrease Increase No Change Never Paid   Decrease Increase No Change Never Paid 
Payer 
Total Assets 764.63 41,912.65 20,281.76 - - 42,611.03 23,351.02 - 
Market Value 541.29 27,491.15 29,990.14 - - 19,382.33 29,155.29 - 
Profitability 1 0.04 0.01 0.01 - - 0.01 0.03 - 
Profitabilty 2 0.04 0.03 0.04 - - 0.05 0.07 - 
Earned Equity 0.28 0.77 0.29 - - 0.74 0.85 - 
Growth Opportunities 1 0.71 0.70 1.60 - - 0.60 1.03 - 
Growth Opportunities 2 -0.99 0.00 -12.00 - - 0.00 0.00 - 
Switcher 
Total Assets - - 16,029.08 - 57,347.06 56,801.30 14,895.19 - 
Market Value - - 13,628.66 - 25,733.97 38,610.95 6,745.16 - 
Profitability 1 - - 0.02 - -0.04 0.04 0.01 - 
Profitabilty 2 - - 0.05 - -0.06 0.06 0.04 - 
Earned Equity - - 0.34 - 0.74 0.42 0.46 - 
Growth Opportunities 1 - - 1.71 - 0.45 0.68 0.41 - 
Growth Opportunities 2   - - -4.93 -   0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
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NASDAQ, or AMEX increases these firms association with financial security. Another 
point of interest is that no dividend payer decreased a dividend payment during a 
recession. On the other hand, decreases were seen in expansionary periods. This is also 
similar to results in Chapter 2, where U.S. firms were more likely to decrease a dividend 
during an expansionary period. Average growth opportunities also decreased during 
economic contractions, limiting what firms could earn with reinvestment, which may 
have allowed for a dividend increase. 
Switcher firms neither increased nor decreased dividends during economic 
expansions. These sporadic dividend payers were more likely to make changes during 
economic contractions. Total assets, market value, profitability, and growth opportunities 
decreased for switcher firms during economic recessions, but firms that increased or 
decreased dividend levels had market values and total assets that were far higher than 
those of the average switcher firm. Firms that increased dividends also had growth 
opportunities higher than those of the average firm. 
Table 28 displays results of a polytomous logistic regression where the response 
variable is  
 ௜ܻ ൌ ቐ
1	݂݅	ݐ݄݁	݀݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݅݊ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁ݏ																					
2	݂݅	ݐ݄݁	݀݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݀݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁ݏ																					
3	݂݅	ݐ݄݁	݀݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	ݎ݁݉ܽ݅݊ݏ	ݑ݄݊ܿܽ݊݃݁݀
 (12) 
Predictor variables include dividend paying status, the state of the economy, total 
assets, earned equity, growth opportunities, and profitability. Non-dividend payers are 
excluded from this analysis as there are only three instances where a non-dividend payer 
distributed dividends. 
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Table 28 
 
Generalized Logarithmic Regressions with Growth Opportunities 1 and Profitability 1, 
ADRs 
 
The probability modeled is that Change = ‘No Change’. Using a polytomous logit model, variables are 
selected using a generalized logit procedure and Newton-Raphson optimization technique. The Status effect 
is represented by a two binary variables: Payer. The binary variable “Payer” is equal to 1 if the firm has 
paid a regular cash dividend (distribution code “1232” in the CRSP database) in all of the previous 12 
quarters, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. We measure the effect of the market according to the expansion and 
contractions measured through GDP, GNI, Unemployment, Industrial Production, and Retail Sales. The 
Economic Cycle effect is introduced as a binary variable called Expansion that is equal to 1 if the market is 
in an expansionary quarter and 0 when the market is in a contraction or recession period. Total Assets is the 
book value of total assets in the prior quarter. Growth Opportunities 1 is calculated as the ratio of the 
market value of total capital to the book value of total assets ((book value of total assets-book value of 
equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets) in the prior quarter. Profitability 1 is calculated 
as the ratio of earnings before interest to the book value of total assets in the prior quarter.  
 
Panel 1: Fit Statistics 
Criterion 
Intercept 
Only 
Intercept And 
Covariates 
AIC 74 73 
SC 81 120 
-2 Log L 70 45 
Panel 2: Analysis of Effects with Effect Coding 
Effect DF 
Wald 
ChiSq 
Prob 
ChiSq 
Status 2 3.55 0.1697 
Economic Cycle 2 10.34 0.0057 
Total Assets 2 4.79 0.0911 
Growth Opportunities1 2 2.23 0.328 
Earned Equity 2 0.95 0.621 
Profitability1 2 3.19 0.203 
Panel 3: Parameter Estimates with Effect Coding 
Variable ClassVal0 Response DF Estimate StdErr 
Wald 
ChiSq 
Prob 
ChiSq 
Intercept Decrease 1 -4.21 1.54 7.43 0.0064 
Intercept Increase 1 -3.22 1.45 4.94 0.0262 
Status Payer Decrease 1 0.40 0.81 0.24 0.6241 
Status Payer Increase 1 1.64 0.89 3.40 0.0652 
Economic Cycle Expansion Decrease 1 -1.36 0.77 3.10 0.0781 
Economic Cycle Expansion Increase 1 -1.98 0.70 7.99 0.0047 
Total Assets Decrease 1 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.4742 
Total Assets Increase 1 0.00 0.00 4.44 0.0352 
Growth Opportunities Decrease 1 -0.73 1.69 0.18 0.668 
Growth Opportunities Increase 1 -4.51 3.12 2.09 0.1479 
Earned Equity Decrease 1 0.40 1.20 0.11 0.7371 
Earned Equity Increase 1 0.84 0.90 0.89 0.346 
Profitability1 Decrease 1 16.89 24.24 0.49 0.486 
Profitability1   Increase 1 39.68 23.67 2.81 0.0937 
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Table 28 (continued) 
 
Panel 4: Odds Ratio Estimates 
Effect Response OddsRatioEst LowerCL UpperCL 
Status               Payer vs Switcher Decrease 2.203 0.094 51.886 
Status               Payer vs Switcher Increase 26.556 0.813 867.069 
Economic Cycle        Expansion vs Recession Decrease 0.066 0.003 1.357 
Economic Cycle        Expansion vs Recession Increase 0.019 0.001 0.297 
Total Assets Decrease 1 1 1 
Total Assets Increase 1 1 1 
Growth Opportunities Decrease 0.484 0.018 13.342 
Growth Opportunities Increase 0.011 <0.001 4.949 
Earned Equity Decrease 1.494 0.143 15.575 
Earned Equity Increase 2.327 0.402 13.49 
Profitability1 Decrease 2.16E+07 <0.001 2.16E+07 
Profitability1 Increase 1.71E+17 0.001 1.71E+17 
 
 
The Type III analysis of effects in Panel 2 shows the change in fit that results in 
excluding one of the covariates. Only the state of the economy has a significant effect on 
dividend level changes at the 1% level. This is far different from the results in Chapter 2 
for U.S. firms, where most of the dividend determinants were significant in determining 
dividend level changes. Total assets also has a discernable effect of dividend changes, but 
only at the 10% level. 
The estimates for intercepts in Panel 3 are the log-odds ratios for Switchers during 
Recessions. The log-odds of a decrease in the dividend versus no change for switcher 
firms during a recession is -4.21, while the log-odds of an increase in the dividend versus 
no change for switcher firms during a recession is -3.22. This implies a switcher firm is 
unlikely to change a dividend level during a recession. 
According to the odds ratios in Panel 4, a dividend paying firm is 26.556% more 
likely than a switcher to increase a dividend. An economic expansion is likely to cause 
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less movement in the dividend levels for ADRs. In an expansion, a firm is 0.066% less 
likely to decrease, and 0.019% less likely to increase, the dividend level than leave it 
unchanged. A one unit increase in Total Assets increases the likelihood of an increase in 
the dividend by 1% over leaving the dividend unchanged. An increase in growth 
opportunities decreases the likelihood that the dividend level will change. On the other 
hand a one unit change in profitability, drastically increases the likelihood that the 
dividend will increase. This result may be a product of the few ADR firms that actually 
pay dividends and the wide variability in profitability that exists between them. 
In order to examine returns of ADRs across dividend paying groups and economic 
cycles, we employ the Fama-French two-factor model for explaining international 
returns: 
 ܴ െ ܨ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾሾܯ െ ܨሿ ൅ ܿሾܪ െ ܮܤ/ܯሿ ൅ ݁ (13) 
Where R –  F is the return, in excess of the US T-bill, on any portfolio, M – F is the 
excess return on the global market, and H – LB/M is the difference between the return on 
the high book-to-market international portfolio and the low book-to-market international 
portfolio. Monthly data for the factors in this model is available on Professor Kenneth R. 
French’s data library website. 
Table 29 displays parameter estimates for the Fama – French two-factor model for 
international firms. According to the model, American Depository Receipt firms have 
significant negative abnormal returns, regardless of the dividend paying status of the 
firm. The very low R-squares for all ADRs, regular dividend payers, switchers, and non- 
dividend paying ADRs highlight the fact that the Fama-French two-factor model does not 
adequately explain returns for ADRs. Although this model does very well at explaining 
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Table 29 
 
Fama-French Two Factor Regressions by Dividend-Paying Status, ADRs (1993-2009) 
 
Monthly returns of ADRs are from the CRSP database. Monthly market and book-to-market factors for international 
firms are from Professor Kenneth French’s data library. Regression results for the Fama-French two-factor model Ri = 
ai + bi(Rm-Rf) + hiHML + ei are shown below. The number of regular dividend payers ranges from just one in several 
quarters to a maximum of seven in the second quarter in 2006 through the second quarter in 2008. The number od 
switchers ranges from one in several quarters to a maximum of ten in the second quarter of 2008, the fourth quarter of 
2009, and the first quarter of 2009. The number of nonpayers ranges from a minimum of 28 in the first quarter in 1993 
to 257 in the second quarter of 2009. 
 
  Estimated Parameter Values 
  
T-Values   
R-Sq Sample a b h a b h 
All -0.290 0.011 0.007 -297.84 59.30 19.22 0.081 
Regular -0.252 0.011 0.008 -27.34 6.29 2.61 0.111 
Switcher -0.229 0.014 0.001 -25.21 8.24 0.38 0.121 
Nonpayer -0.232 0.013 0.005 -155.54 44.31 9.7 0.113 
  
returns of international firms (R-square of 97% (see Fama and French, 1998, Table IV, p 
1983)), it can only explain about 8% of ADR returns. The market and book-to-market 
factors are statistically significant (except for the book-to-market factor for switcher 
firms), but the intercept is largely significant in all cases, implying misspecification or 
missing explanatory terms. 
 Table 30 displays results for two-factor Fama-French regressions for all ADRs, 
regular dividend payers, and switchers according to the change in dividend levels. Non-
dividend payers are excluded because there were only three cases where a non-dividend 
payer paid a dividend. In all cases, except switchers who decreased the dividend level, 
the model shows significant negative abnormal returns, with dividend payer experiencing 
the largest negative abnormal returns. Despite these findings, explanatory power is low in 
most cases. Although dividend payers and switchers who decreased dividends have R- 
squares of 0.90 and 0.80 the book-to-market factor in the Fama-French two factor model 
is insignificant. The same can be said of switchers who increased dividends. 
 
 
107 
 
Table 30 
 
Fama-French Two Factor Regressions by Dividend-Paying Status and Dividend Change, 
ADRs (1993-2009) 
 
Monthly returns of ADRs are from the CRSP database. Monthly market and book-to-market factors for international 
firms are from Professor Kenneth French’s data library. Regression results for the Fama-French two-factor model Ri = 
ai + bi(Rm-Rf) + hiHML + ei are shown below.  
 
  Estimated Parameter Values   T-Values   
R-Sq Sample a b h   a b h 
All 
Decrease -0.222 0.019 -0.005 -3.7 2.32 -0.4 0.29 
Increase -0.199 0.012 0.008 -6.72 2.1 0.86 0.16 
No Change -0.250 0.009 0.012 -24.28 4.61 3.37 0.11 
Regular 
Decrease -0.454 0.037 0.009 -15.48 4.8 1.1 0.90 
Increase -0.212 0.010 0.000 -5.94 1.54 0.03 0.07 
No Change -0.262 0.010 0.012 -23.4 4.67 3.06 0.12 
Switcher 
Decrease -0.059 0.013 0.012 -1.27 2.58 1.38 0.80 
Increase -0.188 0.014 0.019 -2.11 1.07 1.48 0.56 
No change -0.175 0.005 0.024   -6.82 1.12 1.98   0.15 
 
Table 31 displays results for Fama-French two-factor regressions for all firms 
according to the dividend paying status of the firm and the state of the economy. Again, 
all firms, regardless of dividend paying status and economic conditions are shown to have 
significant negative abnormal returns. In most cases, except for all firms and switchers 
during economic expansions, the book-to-market factor is insignificant. Once again, we 
can draw the conclusion that the Fama-French two-factor model to explain returns of 
international firms cannot explain returns for American Depository Receipts, despite the 
fact that these are international equity securities. The lack of goodness of fit can be  
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Table 31 
 
Fama-French Two Factor Regressions by Dividend-Paying Status and Economic Cycle, 
ADRs (1993-2009) 
 
Monthly returns of ADRs are from the CRSP database. Monthly market and book-to-market factors for international 
firms are from Professor Kenneth French’s data library. Regression results for the Fama-French two-factor model Ri = 
ai + bi(Rm-Rf) + hiHML + ei are shown below.divide the samples into two economic periods to distinguish between 
recession and non-recession periods. Recessions are defined as two consecutive quarterly declines in GDP, GNI, 
Industrial Production, and Retail Sales, with the simultaneous increase of Unemployment. 
 
  Estimated Parameter Values   T-Values   
R-Sq Sample a b h   a b h 
All 
Expansion -0.34 0.01 -0.01 -136.03 22.16 -10.01 0.09 
Recession -0.26 0.01 0.00 -30.00 3.02 -1.42 0.02 
Regular 
Expansion -0.39 0.01 0.00 -26.57 3.62 -0.79 0.10 
Recession -0.27 0.02 0.04 -3.83 1.41 0.92 0.36 
Switcher 
Expansion -0.35 0.02 -0.01 -20.93 5.92 -1.48 0.17 
Recession -0.23 0.01 0.00 -4.02 0.75 0.29 0.03 
Nonpayer 
Expansion -0.34 0.01 -0.01 -132.24 21.23 -9.90 0.09 
Recession -0.26 0.01 0.00   -29.71 2.70 -1.61   0.02 
 
explained by the small sample of international firms that are ADRs, and there are only a 
handful of them that pay dividends. 
4.6. Summary and Conclusions  
 In terms of dividend determinants and dividend properties, American Depository 
Receipts are very different from equity securities issued by U.S. firms. Although payment 
amounts are similar in value, regular, quarterly cash dividend distributions are rare 
among ADRs.  There was evidence that dividend payments were increasing in recent 
times, but they are still very few.  
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 This study on American Depository Receipts is limited by the lack of regular, 
quarterly cash dividends, as well as the limited data availability on ADRs. In order to 
examine dividend determinants, data is needed on firm fundamentals. Although the 
Datastream database is rich in data on ADRs, key accounting variables needed for this 
study could only be found on the COMPUSTAT database, which is somewhat limited in 
that it covers only ADRs that are traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX exchanges. 
Future research in this area my involve examining all dividends paid by ADRs, rather 
than just those coded as regular, quarterly cash dividends. 
 Using the data available, the analysis above implies differences in determinants of 
dividend level changes. The analysis shows dividend paying status, implied by the 
dividend policies of the firm within the previous twelve quarters, economic conditions, 
size, measured by total assets, growth opportunities, and profitability can determine 
whether a firm will change the dividend level of the firm. 
 Analysis of returns using the Fama-French two-factor model for international 
firms found that American Depository Receipts have significant negative abnormal 
returns. However, the R-squares of the Fama-French regressions showed a lack of fit, 
with the two-factor model only being able to predict about 8% of the variability in ADR 
returns. 
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CHAPTER 5: FINAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1. Summary of Empirical Findings 
 This dissertation examines dividend payments in a manner not studied before. The 
objectives of this dissertation are: 1) to determine whether dividend payment history and 
the state of the U.S. economy can be used to predict dividend payment for U.S. 
companies, 2) to determine whether dividend payment history and the state of the U.S. 
economy can be used to predict changes in the dividend level of U.S. companies, 3) to 
determine whether changes in dividend payments of ADRs are affected by the dividend 
payment history of the firm and the home country’s economic state, and finally, 4) to 
examine returns according to the dividend paying status of the firm. 
 In the second chapter of this dissertation we examine the probability of dividend 
payment for U.S. firms. The importance of a firm’s dividend payment history and the 
economic situation are the determinants focused on in this study. Their contribution to the 
likelihood that a dividend will be paid is analyzed, while controlling for various 
determinants already identified in previous literature. We control for size, earned equity, 
growth opportunities, and profitability.  
Status is a variable constructed within this dissertation to summarize the dividend 
payment history of a firm. The last twelve quarters of dividend distributions are 
employed to create this variable. If, within the past twelve quarters, a firm paid a 
dividend classified as a regular, quarterly, cash dividend by the CRSP database, then the 
firm is classified as a regular dividend paying firm. If the firm did not pay any dividends 
in the previous twelve quarters, the firm is classified as a non-dividend payer. However, 
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if the firm occasionally paid dividends in the previous twelve quarters, the firm is 
identified as a switcher firm. 
In order to evaluate economic conditions, we use three different measures: The 
first measure we use is the NBER’s classifications of economic contractions and 
expansion. According to the NBER, economic contractions occurred from March 2001 
through November 2001 and December 2007 through June 2009. In our study, we label 
these periods as economic recessions, and all other periods are classified as economic 
expansions. We also use the classic definition of GDP. If two consecutive quarterly 
declines in GDP occur, we classify the following period as an economic recession. All 
other periods are classified as economic expansions. Finally, we use the return on the 
S&P 500 index to measure economic conditions. 
Using a binary logisitic regression we find that, in fact, the firm’s dividend 
payment history and the economic conditions at the time of the announcement are 
important factors in determining dividend payment. Whether the NBER classifications of 
economic contractions and expansions are used or the return on the S&P 500 Index is 
used to measure economic conditions, logistic regressions find that including this effect 
in the model for determining dividend payment considerable improves the fit of the 
model. In other words, economic conditions have a discernable effect on dividend 
payment. 
The third chapter of this dissertation examines dividend level changes of U.S. 
companies that trade on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX exchanges.  The focus of this 
chapter is to determine whether dividend paying status and economic conditions affect 
dividend level changes. Firms are classified according to dividend paying status, as in 
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Chapter 1. Economic conditions are measured using the NBER classifications for 
economic expansions and contractions. 
Results of polytomous logistic regressions imply that dividend paying firms are 
most likely to change dividends. All firms are likely to adjust dividend payments during 
economic expansions, although increases are more likely than decreases. 
Polytomous logistic regressions are also used to determine the probability of 
dividend changes of American Depository Receipts. In order to measure economic 
conditions in the home country we construct an effect called Economic Cycle. This effect 
is measured using gross domestic product (GDP), gross national income (GNI), industrial 
production, retail sales, and unemployment. If GDP, GNI, industrial production, and 
retail sales decline for two consecutive quarters, while unemployment increases, we 
classify the next quarter as a recession. All other periods are classified as economic 
expansions. Results of the polytomous logistic regressions imply that regular dividend 
paying ADRs are more likely to change dividend levels. Also, healthy economic 
conditions in the home country are more likely to induce changes in the dividend level. 
Quarterly returns of all U.S. stocks, regular dividend paying stocks, non-dividend 
paying stocks, and switcher stocks are regressed against the three Fama-French factors. 
Fama-French three-factor regressions for reveal that regular dividend paying U.S. firms 
earn substantially higher abnormal returns, as compared to non-dividend paying firms 
and switcher firms. In order to examine returns on American Depository Receipts, the 
Fama-French two-factor model for international firms is employed. Two-factor 
regressions using returns for all ADRs, regular dividend paying ADRs, non-dividend 
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paying ADRs, and switcher ADRs imply that all ADRs, regardless of their dividend 
paying status, earn significant negative returns.  
This dissertation is important to investors holding dividend paying securities in 
their portfolios because the empirical results show that dividend payments are dependent 
upon the firm’s dividend payment history and the current economic conditions. Firms are 
likely to continue according to the dividend payment patterns established within the 
previous twelve quarters. However, firms that are dividend payers, but can no longer 
sustain dividend payments are likely to discontinue dividend payments during relatively 
good economic conditions. In terms of dividend changes, more volatility is seen in 
payments of regular dividend paying firms. Also, good economic conditions are likely to 
bring about more volatility. Although firms are most likely to increase dividends during 
expansions, a decrease in dividends is still more likely than no change. Implications are 
similar for American Depository receipts.  
Implications regarding the returns aspect of this dissertation are meaningful for 
investors who are concerned with the risk-return relationship. Returns of regular dividend 
paying firms are much higher than the returns of other firms with similar risk. This 
implies that dividend paying firms are excellent securities for risk-averse investors. On 
the other hand, American Depository Receipts earn negative abnormal returns. The 
returns on these securities do not compensate investors for the level of riskiness 
associated with ADRs. 
5.2. Limitations 
A limitation common to the study in Chapter 2 and the study in Chapter 3 is 
related to the classification of dividend paying status. We determined the status based on 
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the firm’s dividend payments in the previous twelve quarters. We concluded that based 
on its recent dividend paying patterns, the market would either identify it as a firm that 
regularly pays dividends, a firm that does not pay dividends at all, or a firm that pays 
dividends occasionally, but not regularly. This may classify a few firms incorrectly in 
some periods. For example, a firm that has never paid a dividend will be classified as a 
nonpayer. However, if that firm should pay a dividend the next period, then according to 
our classification, a nonpayer paid a dividend. In the next quarter, this firm would be 
classified as a switcher because it only paid one dividend in the past twelve quarters, even 
if it will continue as a regular dividend payer in the future. Although we have a few of 
these instances, for the most part, firms are classified correctly, as the market would 
identify them. 
Another limitation is the lack of data available of American Depository Receipts. 
COMPUSTAT is limited to equity securities that trade on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and 
AMEX exchanges. Therefore, ADRs trading on other exchanges are not examined in this 
study.  
The small number of regular, quarterly, cash dividend payments by American 
Depository Receipts compounds the data availability problem. This problem can be 
overcome by examining all cash distributions paid by ADRs. However, new limitations 
of the study will arise. Examining all types of dividends will complicate the study by 
possibly introducing multiple dividend payments in the same quarter. Other dividends, 
such as special dividends or monthly dividends tend to be in very different amounts than 
regular, quarterly dividends. This will also bring about more variability in the dividend 
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change. The question of comparability is also introduced because the dividends have 
different classifications. 
5.3. Future Research  
Future research regarding dividend payment could focus on a distress variable. 
This would be of special interest during the recent financial crisis. Although there were 
only a few firms that omitted dividends, they were highlighted extensively in the 
financial news as distressed firms. Distress variables have been examined in the past in 
terms of the probability of bankruptcy. A similar approach can be used to determine 
dividend payment. 
Dividend changes can also be examined in an event study where cumulative 
abnormal returns are calculated after the dividend announcement. This type of study 
would be similar to the event studies mentioned in the literature review in Chapter 3. 
These types of studies are commonly used for examining tax impacts and dividend 
recapture of ex-dividend dates. 
The study on American Depository receipts, in Chapter 4, can be conducted at a 
future date to obtain more conclusive results. American Depository Receipts have 
recently become a popular vehicle for international investment, and more and more 
international firms are becoming part of ADR programs. However, at the present time, 
data availability seems to be the greatest hindrance in making certain conclusions. 
5.4. Concluding Remarks 
The recent financial crisis highlighted changes in dividend payment policy. The 
financial news was filled with reports of dividend reductions, omissions, and suspensions. 
After examining various dividend related variables highlighted by previous literature, this 
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study finds that dividend paying history, at least within the previous twelve quarters, is 
especially important in determining the probability that a firm will pay a regular, 
quarterly, cash dividend in the next quarter. The state of the economy is also important in 
determining dividend payment. Although the financial news highlighted changes in 
dividend downgrades during the recent recession, it is more likely that regular dividend 
paying firms will discontinue or omit dividends in good economic states. 
Dividend paying history and the economic climate are also important for 
determining the probability of dividend level changes, whether the firm is a U.S. firm or 
an American Depository Receipt. Increases in total assets and profitability were related to 
an increase in the likelihood of a change in dividend levels, while increases in growth 
opportunities were related to the likelihood of a dividend decrease. 
The study involving American Depository Receipts is limited by the few number 
of regular, quarterly, cash dividend payments, as well as limited data availability of key 
accounting data used for creating the dividend determinant measures. 
Analysis of returns of U.S. stocks using the Fama-French three-factor model 
reveals that regular dividend paying firms have positive and significant abnormal returns, 
despite the fact that non-dividend payers have higher average returns. This implies that, 
on average, dividend paying stocks are earning more return for their level of risk. On the 
other hand, the Fama-French two-factor model for international firms reveals that all 
American Depository Receipts earn significant negative abnormal returns, regardless of 
their dividend paying status. However, the results for the ADRs are questionable due to 
the weaknesses mentioned above, and the fact that the R-squares for the Fama-French 
two-factor models are very low. 
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APPENDIX  
 
APPENDIX A 
 
A PRIMER ON AMERICAN DEPOSITORY RECEIPTS 
 
 American Depository Receipts, usually referred to as ADRs, represent ownership 
of shares of a foreign company. Investors tend to shy away from foreign stocks because 
of the risks and costs associated with buying and selling foreign securities. ADRs 
eliminate some of those obstacles. They are convenient for U.S. investors because they 
are priced in U.S. Dollars, pay dividends in U.S. Dollars, and trade like U.S. shares. 
However, foreign exchange risk still exists because the price of the security tracks the 
price of the foreign stock it is derived from.  
 ADRs are issue by U.S. depository banks. At the present time, there are five of 
depository banks: JPMorgan, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, the Bank of New York Mellon, 
and the Computershare Trust Company of New York. The shares issued by these banks 
can represent a share, a fraction of a share, or multiple shares of the foreign firm. An 
investor who owns an ADR can also choose to obtain the foreign stock, but it is more 
convenient to hold an ADR. 
 There are different levels of ADR firms, which determine their regulations and 
characteristics. An unsponsored ADR is one that trades on over-the-counter markets. The 
foreign firm has no formal agreement with a depository bank. These are the least 
regulated. Therefore, most ADRs are unsponsored. A Level I ADR is also an over-the-
counter ADR, but the foreign firm has a formal agreement with a depository bank to act 
as its transfer agent. Regulations and reporting are also minimal for Level I ADRs. 
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 A Level II ADR requires far more regulation than Level I because these are traded 
on exchanges. They fall under SEC regulation and must file annual reports and follow 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or International Financial Reporting 
Standards. A Level III ADR is also heavily regulated because these types of ADRs are 
traded on exchanges and are able to issue shares to raise new capital within the U.S. 
 Dividend payments of ADRs can be inconvenient for U.S. investors because of 
the regulations and procedures involved. Dividend payments are issued by the foreign 
firm in the foreign currency. They then have to be converted to U.S. Dollars. The amount 
a U.S. investor receives is less than the actual dividend paid because conversion expenses 
and foreign taxes must be paid. Withholding tax is also a problem in some instances, but 
it may be recoverable on U.S. tax filings. 
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